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Abstract 
At the Millennium Summit, the world community pledged to promote gender equality and 
chose as a specific target the achievement of gender equity in primary and secondary 
education by the year 2005 in every country of the world.  Based on the findings from a 
growing empirical literature that suggests that gender equity in education promotes economic 
growth and reduce fertility, child mortality, and undernutrition, we estimate what the costs in 
terms of growth, and forgone fertility, mortality and undernutrition reduction, will be for the 
45 countries that are, on current projections, unlikely to meet the target.  Our estimates 
suggest that, by 2005, the countries that are off track are likely to suffer 0.1-0.3 percentage 
points lower per capita growth rates as a result and will have 0.1-0.4 more children per 
woman, and, by 2015, an average of 14 per 1000 higher rates of under five mortality and 2.4 
percentage points higher prevalence of underweight children under five.  Sensitivity analyses 
suggest that the results are quite robust to using different specifications and approaches to 
estimating these losses.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Apart from its intrinsic value as a crucial development goal (Sen, 1999), education is also 
central to one’s ability to respond to the opportunities that development presents.   Currently, 
there are significant gender disparities in education that remain in several regions of the 
developing world (World Bank, 2001).  Disparities persist in enrolment rates, which capture 
education flows, in average years of schooling, which represent the stock of education in the 
population, in quality and type of education, and in subject matters studied. 
The gender gap and the low level of girls’ educational participation and performance are 
the result of the combined effects of supply and demand factors and the ways these interact 
with the policy, economic, and sociocultural environments (e.g. Alderman et al., 1995).  
Supply-side factors include the availability of schools, the quality of services they provide, 
and the extent to which the services are adapted to the special needs of girls.  Demand-side 
factors relate to how girls and their families respond to the kinds of schooling made available 
by the state and by religious and private groups.  Important determinants include the direct 
costs (e.g. fees, uniforms, transport, books) and opportunity costs of education to the family.   
In addition, the decision to send girls may further be influenced by the family's 
perception of the value of education, both for the girls themselves as well as for the parents to 
the extent that they expect some support from their children in old age and during adverse 
economic times (Hill and King, 1993).   In cultures where girls marry early, settle with their 
husband’s family, where their access to the labour market is constrained and available jobs are 
unattractive, parents are more reluctant to send girls to school.1      
Nonetheless, female primary and secondary enrolment rates and  have generally risen 
over time and there has been a corresponding rise in attainments (see Table A).  Gender 
equality in school enrolments and average years of schooling has also improved since the 
1970s as girls’ schooling has generally increased faster than boys’ (World Bank, 2001).  
However, there is variation in the gender disparity and the speed in closing gender gaps, with 
East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, and Europe and Central Asia exhibiting the highest 
gender equality in education.  As of 1999, primary enrolment rates had flattened out at high 
levels in these three regions, with gross enrolment rates for females reaching or surpassing 
100 percent.    Furthermore, average female secondary enrolment rates equal or exceed male 
rates in Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and women average about 90 percent as 
many years of schooling as men.  Within these regions, there are, however, diverging trends.  
While in most of Latin America and Eastern Europe, girls’ enrolment rates have remained 
high in absolute terms, and relative to boys’, in some Central Asian countries, girls’ enrolment 
rates are now trailing boys’ and a widening gender gap has been observed in some countries 
(see Table 1 in the annex).  Starting from lower initial levels of gender equality, South Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa all registered noteworthy declines 
in gender disparities in primary and secondary enrolments between 1975 and 1999.  
Nonetheless, South Asia’s gender equality in education is the lowest, with women in South 
Asia averaging only about half as many years of education as men, and female enrolment 
rates at the secondary level only two-thirds of male rates.  Moreover, South Asia’s gender 
inequalities in education are larger than in other developing regions where absolute levels of 
female education are lower.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the increases in gender equality in 
enrolment rates at the primary level between 1980 and 1990 often tended to reflect absolute 
declines in boys’ enrolment rates rather than improvements in girls’.  Moreover Sub-Saharan 
Africa made no real progress in closing the gender gap in average years of schooling between 
                                                 
1 The willingness to invest in a daughter’s education can also depend on the perceived value of education for the 
daughter’s marriage options, particularly the possibility to have them marry someone of higher perceived social 
or economic status.    
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1970 and 1995, so that absolute levels of female enrolment and schooling remain lower in 
Sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing regions.    
 
Table A: Gross Enrolment Rates Education Attainment, by Region 
 
While there has been a clear trend toward gender equality in education since 1970, the 
gains have been slow and uneven for the poorest regions.  As a result of these persistent gaps, 
the world community pledged at the Millennium Summit to promote gender equality and 
empower women, with particular emphasis on gender equality in education.  The chosen 
target was to eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and all 
levels of education no later than 2015 (United Nations, 2000). 
There are several rationales for this goal and one has to distinguish between intrinsic and 
instrumental concerns.  On the intrinsic aspects, if our concern is with aggregate well-being as 
measured by, for example, Sen’s notion of ‘capabilities’ (Sen, 1999), then we should view the 
important capabilities of education as critical constituent elements in well-being.  Gender 
inequality will reduce aggregate well-being two-fold.  First, there is likely to be a declining 
marginal well-being effect of education so that gains for the high education of boys will be 
smaller than the associated losses suffered by the lower education of girls.  Second, societies 
and individuals have been found to exhibit inequality aversion in the sense that societies with 
the same average achievement, but lower inequality, are preferred to societies with the same 
achievement and larger gaps2.   
In addition, one may be concerned about gender equity as a development goal in its own 
right (apart from its beneficial impact on other development goals) as has been, for example, 
recognized in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), signed and ratified by a majority of developing countries.   
Apart from these intrinsic disadvantages of gender inequality, one may be concerned 
about instrumental effects of gender inequality in education.  Gender inequality in education 
may have adverse impacts on a number of valuable development goals.  First, gender 
inequality in education may prevent the reduction of child mortality, fertility, and 
undernutrition, as well as reduce the education gains of the next generation.  To the extent that 
these linkages exist, gender bias in education may thus generate instrumental problems for 
development policy-makers as it compromises progress in other important development goals, 
                                                 
2 This has, for example, been recognized in the creation of UNDP’s Gender-Related Development Index which, 
derived from a notion of aversion to inequality, suggests that a country with higher gender inequality achieves a 
lower level of aggregate well-being compared to another with equal average achievements, but lower gender 
gaps (UNDP, 1995).  This is achieved using an Atkinson-type inequality measure.  For a further discussion, see 
Grün and Klasen (2000) and Bardhan and Klasen (1999, 2000). 
Region Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males
East Asia & Pacific 108 121 106 105 35 49 60 65 3.06 4.54 5.85 6.84
Europe & Central Asia .. .. 93 95 .. .. 80 81 8.09 8.93 9.67 9.20
Latin America & Caribbean 97 100 130 133 34 35 87 80 3.52 4.14 5.58 5.91
Middle East & North Africa 64 99 91 99 24 44 67 72 1.39 2.75 4.21 5.74
South Asia 58 91 91 110 15 33 41 57 1.08 2.95 2.94 5.31
Sub-Saharan Africa a 45 66 73 85 6 13 23 28 1.56 2.60 2.82 3.98
a Latest available data on primary GERs are from 1998 and on secondary GERs from 1996.
b Attainment data include schooling beyond secondary.  Since data are from Barro and Lee (2000), the regional classification includes
some countries with per capita incomes too high to be included in the World Bank's database (the one used for the GERs).
Source: World Development Indicators central database and Barro and Lee (2000).
Average Years of Attainment b 
1970 1995
Primary Gross Enrolment Rate Secondary Gross Enrolment Rate
1975 19751999 1999
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including other Millennium Development Goals, particularly the ones relating to child 
mortality, maternal mortality, poverty, and universal primary education. 
Secondly, it may be the case that gender inequality in education reduces economic growth.  
This is an important issue to the extent that economic growth furthers improvement in well-
being (or, at least, enables improvement in well-being).  That economic growth, on average, 
furthers well-being (measured through indicators such as longevity, literacy, and reduced 
poverty) has been demonstrated many times, although not all types of growth do so to the 
same extent (Drèze and Sen, 1989; UNDP, 1996; Bruno et al., 1996; Pritchett and Summers, 
1996).  Thus, policies that further economic growth (and do not harm other important 
development goals) should be of great interest to policy-makers all over the world. 
This paper is concerned with the instrumental impact of countries failing to meet the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on gender equality.  The prospect of countries failing 
to meet the MDG is not just a theoretical possibility but, given our assessment of current 
trends, a likely outcome for some 45 countries for which data exist.  The purpose of the paper 
is therefore to estimate to what extent these countries will suffer losses in terms of economic 
growth, as well as foregone reductions in fertility, child mortality, and undernutrition.  
Conversely, it will allow countries to assess the potential gains from adopting policies that 
bring them closer  to meeting the goal.   
The paper does not present new estimates on the impact of gender inequality in education 
on economic growth but instead relies primarily on two recent studies (Klasen, 2002 and 
Knowles et al., 2002).  It does present estimates of the impact of gender inequality on fertility 
and child mortality, but also uses other studies that have estimated these impacts (Gatti, 1999; 
Murthi and Dreze, 2001; Schultz, 1994; Summers, 1994).   
The main contribution of the paper is therefore to link the data about current trends in 
gender inequality in education with the results of studies that have estimated the impact of 
gender inequality on these various development outcomes.  We will show that countries that 
fail to meet the MDG on gender inequality will have to face considerable costs in terms of 
foregone economic growth, as well as reductions in fertility, child mortality, and 
undernutrition.  These costs will already be apparent by 2005, but will mount thereafter.  
While we are able to present point estimates (with confidence intervals) of these costs, one 
should treat these point estimates with caution and instead consider the entire range of 
estimates that we provide.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses theoretical reasons for 
presuming that gender inequality might compromise progress in these various development 
outcomes.  The following section will present the data on current trends in enrolments and 
transform them into the educational attainment variables that were used in the studies 
examining the costs of gender inequality.  The next section will present the main results on 
the costs, while the conclusion summarizes the main findings.  
 
2. Gender Inequality, Growth, Fertility, Child Mortality, and Undernutrition: 
Theoretical Considerations 
A. Economic Growth 
In line with the theoretical and the empirical literature on economic growth, one can 
postulate the following linkages between the gender gap in education and economic growth: 
a) Lowering the Average Level of Human Capital 
Assuming that boys and girls have a similar distribution of innate abilities and that those 
at the upper end of the ability distribution of each sex are more likely to get educated, gender 
inequality in education must mean that less able boys than girls get the chance to be educated, 
and, more importantly, that the average innate ability of those who get educated is lower than 
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would be the case if boys and girls received equal educational opportunities.  This lowers the 
average level of human capital in the economy and thus reduces economic growth3.  It should 
also lower the impact male education has on economic growth and raise the impact of female 
education, as found by Dollar and Gatti (1999) or Knowles et al. (2002).  This effect could 
reduce economic growth directly through lowering the level of human capital.  In addition, it 
can also reduce the investment rate as the return on investments is lower in a country with 
poorer human capital. Illustrative calculations suggest that this type of effect alone could 
depress per capita growth by some 0.3 percentage points per year in a country where gender 
inequality in education is similar to the levels observed in Sub-Saharan Africa today.4 
A similar effect of lowering the level of human capital would appear if one considers male 
and female human capital as imperfect substitutes and posits declining marginal returns to 
education as done by Knowles et al. (2002).  Then the impact of diminishing returns on the 
higher male education (rather than the selection of less able males) would lower the average 
level of human capital and thus economic growth.  
Both effects are plausible and supported empirically.  Micro studies show that the 
marginal private rate of return to educating girls is larger in many developing countries which 
is likely due to this selection effect as well as declining marginal returns to education (Hill 
and King, 1995; World Bank, 2001; Alderman et al., 1995; Alderman et al., 1996).5 Similarly, 
there is considerable evidence for the imperfect substitutability of male and female labor in 
many settings and simulation studies have shown that a more equal allocation of male and 
female labor among industries would indeed boost economic growth (World Bank, 2001; 
Tzannatos, 1999). 
b) The Combined Effect of Gender Inequality in Education and Wage Discrimination 
In most countries of the world, females experience some wage discrimination in formal 
sector employment which shows up as the unexplained portion of the female-male wage gap 
in earnings regressions (e.g. Horton, 1999; Tzannatos, 1999; World Bank, 2001).  Such wage 
discrimination can boost investment in industries that employ female labor, provided that 
females have enough education to effectively participate in the formal labor market.  
Reducing gender inequality in education may thus enable employers to benefit from 
employing relatively cheaper female labor and they may respond by higher investment in such 
female-intensive employment.   
                                                 
3 One may object that many educated women might not be formally employed so that their human capital cannot 
contribute to economic growth.  Several avenues do, however, point to the effect of greater female human 
capital.   First, more educated women have a much higher chance of being employed so that their human capital 
tends to be used in the formal economy.  Second, even the tasks they perform outside of the formal economy will 
be greatly influenced by their human capital so that also here we would expect an effect.   
4 The calculations assume that innate abilities are normally distributed and compares two possible distributions 
of the student population.  In one, 50 percent of an age cohort get educated and half are male and half are female.  
In the other, 50 percent get educated and 70 percent are male and 30 percent are female.  It turns out that the 
average human capital (which is defined simply as the Z-score of the standardized normal distribution multiplied 
by the 0-1 variable for getting educated) would be some 12 percent lower in the second scenario.  Using the 
regression coefficient on human capital from Mankiw et al. (1992) would yield some 0.3 percentage points 
difference in annual growth.    
5 These studies only consider the private marginal returns.  It is important to point out that this is the case even 
when the private returns to the same level of education are larger for boys (as is often the case as men have 
higher labor force participation rates and tend to earn more than women).  This is due to the fact that, due to 
gender gaps in education, an extra (i.e. marginal) year of schooling for an average girl refers to a lower level of 
education where returns are generally much higher, while an additional year of schooling for boys will be at a 
higher level where returns are much lower.  For a discussion, see World Bank (2001) and Alderman et al. (1995).  
If one included positive externalities of female education (e.g. the effects on fertility, undernutrition, and child 
mortality) and thus considered marginal social returns, the difference between marginal female and male returns 
would be even larger.   
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Here too, there is some  empirical support for this type of effect.  A significant portion of 
high growth in many developing countries, particularly in Asia, has been based on the use of 
female labor in export-oriented manufacturing industries.  This was particularly the case in 
many Asian economies where female education was rapidly improving while there were also 
sizeable wage gaps between females and males favoring female employment and the 
development of female-intensive industries by domestic and foreign investors (Standing, 
1999; Seguino, 2000).6 
c) The ‘Direct’ Externality Factor of Gender Inequality in Education 
Lower gender inequality in education effectively means greater female education at each 
level of male education.  If it is the case that female education has positive external effects on 
the quality of overall education (and male education does not, or not to the same extent), then 
reduced gender inequality should promote a higher quality of education and thus promote 
economic growth.  As female education is believed to promote the quantity and quality of 
education of children (through the support and general environment educated mothers can 
provide their children), this positive externality is likely to exist (World Bank, 2001). 
Moreover, to the extent that similarity in education levels in the household generates 
positive external effects on the quality of education, reduced gender inequality may be one 
way to promote such external effects.  For example, it is likely that equally educated siblings 
can strengthen each other’s educational success through direct support and play inspired by 
educational activities.  Similarly, couples with similar education levels may promote each 
other’s life-long learning.7   
Higher human capital associated with this process can increase economic growth directly 
by increasing the productivity of workers.  But it can also have an indirect effect by increasing 
the rate of return to physical investment which, in turn, raises investment rates and, through 
the effect of investment on economic growth, also increases economic growth. 
d) The Indirect Externality Operating via Demographic Effects 
Three mechanisms are believed to be at the center of this demographic impact on 
economic growth.  They all are related to the fact that fertility decline will reduce the share of 
children and consequently increase the share of workers in the total population.  First, reduced 
fertility lowers the dependency burden, thereby increasing the supply of savings in an 
economy which in turn promotes economic growth.  Second, a large number of people 
entering the workforce as the result of previously high population growth will boost 
investment demand for capital equipment and social overhead investments (housing, etc.).  If 
this higher demand is met by the increased domestic savings and/or capital inflows, these two 
factors will allow investments to expand which should boost growth (Bloom and Williamson, 
1998). Third, a lowering of fertility rates will increase the share of the working age population 
in the total population.   If all the growth in the labor force is absorbed in increased 
employment, then per capita economic growth will increase even if wages and productivity 
remain the same.  This is due to the fact that more workers have to share their wages with 
fewer dependents, thereby boosting average per capita incomes.8  All of these effects are 
                                                 
6 Over time, this effect will erode as the increased demand for female employment will help reduce the gender 
gaps in pay as has been shown in the rapidly growing Asian economies (World Bank, 2001; Tzannatos, 1999; 
Horton, 1999).  But the unexplained portion of the gender gaps has far from disappeared so that this erosion 
appears to take a long time. 
7 Even if people have a preference for marrying someone with similar education levels (as appears to be the 
case), gender inequality in education will force the marriage of educated men with uneducated females and thus 
may prevent the spillover.  For a discussion of these and related issues, see Baliga et al. (1999). 
8 The following calculation illustrates the point.  If 100 workers have to care for 100 dependants, then their 
average wage of $1000 a year will translate into $500 per capita income ((100*$1000)/200).  If, however, 150 
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temporary (referred to by Bloom and Williamson as a ‘demographic gift’) since after a few 
decades the growth in the working age population will fall while the number of the elderly 
will rise, thereby leading to an increasing dependency burden.  This temporary effect is 
believed to have contributed considerably to the high growth rates in East and Southeast Asia 
(Young, 1995; Bloom and Williamson, 1998; ADB, 1997, see below). In fact, Bloom and 
Williamson estimate that 1.4-1.9 percentage points of high annual per capita growth in East 
Asia (and 1.1-1.8 percentage points in Southeast Asia) was due to this demographic gift.  To 
the extent that high female education was among the most important causal factors bringing 
about this fertility decline, it could account for a considerable share of the economic boon 
generated by this demographic gift.9 
B. Fertility, Child Mortality, and Undernutrition 
Economic models of fertility find the opportunity cost of women’s time as well as the 
bargaining power of women to be important determinants of the fertility rate (Becker, 1981; 
Schultz, 1993; Sen, 1999).  Greater female education, and particularly lower gender inequality 
in education, is thus likely to lead to reduced fertility. 
Similarly, models of health production at the household level emphasize the importance of 
the mother’s education as well as her bargaining power.  Greater education increases her 
health knowledge which improves her ability to promote the health of her children (World 
Bank, 1993), gives her greater ability to deal with adverse shocks (World Bank, 2001), and 
greater bargaining power increases her say over household resources which often leads to 
greater allocations to child health and nutrition.  For example, Thomas (1990) found that the 
impact of unearned income on child survival was 20 times greater if the income was brought 
in by the mother than if it was brought in by the father (see World Bank 2001 for a survey).  
Both effects are likely to assist in lowering undernutrition and in reducing child mortality 
rates.  Since reducing educational disparities is one of the most powerful ways of increasing 
the bargaining power of women (World Bank, 2001), promoting gender equity in education 
would thus be expected to promote the reduction of fertility, undernutrition, and child 
mortality directly and indirectly via the effect on bargaining power. 
 
3. Empirical Estimates of the Effects of Gender Bias in Education on Growth, Fertility, 
Child Mortality, and Undernutrition 
 
The above theoretical linkages have also been investigated empirically.  Here we review 
the most important studies and then concentrate on the ones that we are going to use for the 
estimation of the costs of failing to achieve the gender equity MDG.   They are summarized in 
Table B.  In many of these studies, the impact of female education rather than gender 
                                                                                                                                                        
workers have to care for only 50 dependants, then the average wage of $1000 a year will translate into $750 per 
capita income ((150*$1000)/200).     
9 A fourth factor described by Lagerlöf (1999) suggests that there is an interaction between gender inequality in 
education, high fertility, low overall investments in human capital, and therefore economic growth. Here the 
impact of fertility operates mainly via human capital investments for the next generation.  Lagerlöf’s model 
shows that initial gender inequality in education can lead to a self-perpetuating equilibrium of continued gender 
inequality in education, with the consequences of high fertility and low economic growth.  In this model, gender 
inequality in education may generate a poverty trap which would justify public action to escape this low-level 
equilibrium with self-perpetuating gender gaps in education.  Galor and Weil (1996) generate a similar poverty 
trap by postulating that economic growth reduces the gender gap in earnings, and the reduced gender gap 
reduces fertility, which again furthers economic growth.  Countries with low initial incomes may find themselves 
in a position of high gender gaps in earnings, high fertility, and low economic growth. A related demographic 
effect may operate through the health of the next generation.  It has been shown that educated women have 
healthier children and thus indirectly promote economic growth through producing a healthier, more educated 
and more productive workforce (Klasen, 1999; Summers, 1994).  These effects will only appear with some lags 
and are therefore often quite difficult to measure.   
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inequality in education per se is considered.  But since most of these studies simultaneously 
include male education in the analysis, they implicitly consider the impact of gender 
inequality in education (see Knowles et al, 2002).  Also, since our policy exercise is to 
compare current projected paths of female enrolments with target paths that would allow 
countries to meet the goal, while not altering the projected levels of male enrolments, we are 
mainly concerned with the increase in female education that would happen as a result of 
meeting the goal.  
A. Gender Inequality in Education and Economic Growth 
There have been comparatively few studies that have explicitly considered the impact of 
gender inequality on economic growth.  Barro and Lee (1994) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) report the ‘puzzling’ finding that in regressions including male and female years of 
schooling the coefficient on female primary and secondary years of schooling is negative.  
They suggest that a large gap in male and female schooling may signify backwardness and 
may therefore be associated with lower economic growth.   
There are reasons to question this result, however.  Dollar and Gatti (1999) show that the 
result disappears once a dummy variable for Latin America is included suggesting that the 
‘puzzling’ effect may be due to the combination of low growth and comparatively high 
female education in Latin America.10 
The ‘puzzling’ finding may also be related to multicollinearity.  In most countries, male 
and female schooling are closely correlated which makes it difficult to empirically identify the 
effects of each individually.  The correlation coefficient between male and female total years 
of schooling and similar attainment measures (such as the share of the adult population that 
has achieved secondary education) is consistently above 0.9 for a large sample of countries 
considered by Barro and also in this study.  Large standard errors on male and female 
education and the sudden reversal of this finding in different specifications is further evidence 
of this problem (Lorgelly and Owen, 1999; Knowles et al. 2002).   
Hill and King (1995) study the impact of gender differences in education on income.  
Instead of trying to account for growth of GDP, they relate levels of GDP to gender inequality 
in education.  They find that a low female-male enrollment ratio is associated with a lower 
level of GDP per capita, over and above the impact of levels of female education on GDP per 
capita. 
Knowles et al. (2002) also estimate the impact of gender inequality in education on levels 
of GDP per capita in an explicit Solow framework, treating adult male and female levels of 
education as separate factors of production.  Their study is based on estimating the impact of 
male and female education on the long-run (or steady-state level) of GDP.  They estimate 
these long run level relationships based on average GDP per capita (in log form) for 1960 to 
1990 which they relate to average levels of male and female education (and other averaged 
covariates) for the same time period.11  With that they can then derive an elasticity for female 
and male education on GDP which conveys by how many percent a 1 percent increase in 
female or male education would increase the long-run level of GDP.  They find that female 
education has a significant positive impact on average GDP levels while male education only 
has an insignificant impact.  The estimated elasticity of the preferred specification is 0.37, i.e. 
a 1 percent increase in female education would increase the average level of GDP by 0.37 
                                                 
10 Moreover, as argued by Knowles et al (2002), the use of base-period values for human capital in their growth 
regression also contributes to this effect as the high growth Asian economies had large initial gender gaps in 
1960 that were only closed subsequently so that the coefficient on female education might pick up East Asia’s 
initial gaps as growth-enhancing.  Inclusion of regional dummy variables should deal with this problem as well.  
Finally, Lorgelly and Owen (1999) suggest that it may also partially be due to the impact of some outliers.   
11 Given that there might be reverse causality involved in the relationship between these averaged variables, they 
also use instrumental variable procedures to control for this endogeneity, which does not qualitatively affect their 
results.  If anything, the effects of female education are now larger. 
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percent.12  The male elasticity is found to be insignificant.  In different parametrizations of the 
model, including one taken from Klasen (1999), they also show that gender inequality itself 
(modelled as a ratio) significantly reduces per capita income levels.  Finally, they also 
investigate the matter in a growth regression framework to study the influence of female 
education on average growth between 1960 and 1990.  There, they find an semi-elasticity of 
0.21, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in female education would increase growth by over 
0.2 percentage points.13  Below, we will use both their level as well as their growth 
regressions, but focus on their level results as they are based on their preferred specification.         
Dollar and Gatti (1999) also examine the relationship between gender inequality in 
education and growth.  They try to explain five-year growth intervals (1975 to 1990) and 
attempt to control for the possible endogeneity between education and growth using 
instrumental variable estimation.14  In contrast to Barro, they find that female secondary 
education achievement (measured as the share of the adult population that have achieved 
some secondary education) is positively associated with growth, while male secondary 
achievement is negatively associated with growth.  In the full sample, both effects are 
insignificant, but it turns out that in countries with low female education, furthering female 
education does not significantly promote economic growth, while in countries with higher 
female education levels, promoting female education has a sizeable and significant positive 
impact on economic growth.  But these results appear to be partly driven by the choice of time 
period (1975-1990), very short panels (5-year), and the use of an unusual and arguably 
problematic education variable (see Klasen, 2002).   
Finally, Klasen (2002) investigates the impact of gender inequality on economic growth, 
using the total years of schooling of male adults and the female-male ratio of that schooling as 
the variables capturing the effect of gender inequality.  These two variables are used both in 
initial levels (in 1960) as well as in changes.  The latter variable is the female-male ratio of 
the (absolute) growth in the years of schooling between 1960 and 1990.  The analysis 
considers possible endogeneities using instrumental variables, panel data analysis, and other 
techniques.  It also examines specifically different pathways by which gender inequality 
might influence economic growth.  Apart from a direct impact, gender inequality might also 
indirectly affect economic growth through the effect it has on population growth, labor force 
growth, and the investment rate, as discussed above.  In addition, the analysis generates 
reduced form estimates that measure the total impact of gender inequality on economic 
growth.  Those regressions show that both the initial ratio of female to male education has a 
significant positive impact on subsequent growth as does the female to male ratio of the 
growth of education (even if one controls for endogeneity).  The point estimate for the initial 
ratio is 1.64 (i.e. had the female-male ratio in a country been 0.6 instead of 0.5, growth would 
have been 0.16% faster) and for the ratio of the growth it is 0.75 (i.e. had the ration of female 
                                                 
12 Two points are worth noting here.  Knowles et al (2002) use the average income of 1960-1990 as the 
dependent variable to determine a long-term steady state relationship between male and female education levels 
and per capita income.  To do that, they want to estimate the relationship over as long a time period as possible 
in order to assess the long-term steady state relationship.  1960-1990 is the longest time span for which they have 
data.  Their interpretation is thus focused on the long-run steady state relationship between the two variables 
rather than on deriving a particular point estimate for the impact of education on average incomes in the time 
period chosen.  Second, they and the other cross-country studies report an average effect of all countries included 
and it is not clear that this average effect will be the same for each individual country.  Barring country-level 
data, these average effects are the best guess of individual country effects so we rely on them for our analysis. 
13 One should point out that their growth specification is merely done to compare results with other findings in 
the literature.  They do not control for endogeneity and do not place high confidence on this result’s point 
estimate. 
14 In particular, they use religion and civil liberty variables as instruments for explaining male and female 
educational achievement.  This would work if both of these variables are uncorrelated with economic growth.  
The latter, however, has been used in a variety of growth regressions and does indeed appear to be associated 
with economic growth (Taylor, 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
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to male expansion been 1.2 instead of 0.7, annual growth would have been nearly 0.4% 
faster).  The findings are robust to various specifications and the use of different education 
variables.   
The paper also reconciles its results with other studies’ and finds them to be similar to 
Knowles et al., while it is possible to show that the Barro results are indeed driven by 
multicollinearity and the absence of regional dummy variables.  Using the data by Dollar and 
Gatti but a different (and arguably more plausible) specification, Klasen (2002) is able to 
show that then gender inequality will have a negative impact on growth in rich and poor 
countries alike. 15 
Thus our reading of the existing studies is that the negative impact of gender inequality in 
education on growth has been substantiated in studies that use a growth regression framework 
(Klasen, 2002) and a Solow framework (Knowles et al., 2002) while the studies finding 
different results have all been shown to be problematic in one respect or another.  We will 
therefore primarily rely on Klasen (2002) for the estimate of the effects.  We will also 
compare the results to the point estimates by Knowles et al. (2002).  The two results are not 
likely to lead to quantitatively similar results due to the large differences in specification and 
estimation strategy.  We will therefore mainly look for qualitative similarity between the two 
findings.16    
 
 
                                                 
15 Klasen (2002) differs from Dollar and Gatti (1999) in using a longer growth interval (under the presumption 
that human capital pays off only in the long term), a longer time period (beginning in 1960 rather than 1975), a 
different measure of human capital, and in trying to deal with the multicollinearity problem.  When trying to 
reconcile the differences between Dollar and Gatti (1999) and Klasen (2002), Klasen finds that the differences 
are largely driven by the former using a different education variable which is not very plausible (the share of the 
population that has exactly achieved some secondary education; those who have achieved more than that will be 
treated identically to those that have achieved no education at all !) and that the former study uses a much shorter 
and arguably less appropriate time interval (1975-1990) where many developing countries were facing severe 
economic crises.  For details, refer to Klasen (2002).   
16 Forbes (2000) also examines the impact of male and female education on economic growth using panel data 
with five-year intervals and a GMM estimator, a version of fixed effects.  In most specifications, female 
education has a significant positive impact on economic growth, while male education has an insignificant (and 
usually slightly negative) impact on economic growth, thus providing very similar results to Knowles et al. 
(2002) and Klasen (2002).  Appiah and McMahon (2002) examine the impact of male and female education on 
growth, fertility, mortality, and other social and political indicators in Africa and then estimate a structural 
equation system to investigate all the feedback systems.  Their findings support both the sizable effect of average 
education and the particularly important impact of female education on growth, where indirect effects operating 
via fertility and child mortality play a particularly important role in the case of female education.  It may also be 
useful to briefly discuss two studies that might question some of the findings of the studies discussed above.  
First, Pritchett (2001) suggests that the expansion of education during the past 30 years has had a negligible (or 
possibly even negative) impact on economic growth, particularly in Africa.  His growth accounting framework 
does not explicitly address the conditional convergence typical of growth models and does not include many 
variables that might have accounted for growth differences.  In Klasen (2002) the change in educational capital, 
a similar variable used by Pritchett, shows a clear positive and significant impact on economic growth.  The 
difference might be due to the fact that Klasen (2002) additionally controls for initial levels of education and not 
only changes thereof, suggesting that there might be a complementarity between initial levels and subsequent 
growth rates.  Also, we focus on female education which, according to the studies above, appears to have had a 
larger effect than male levels, and Prtichett’s results on average levels might be influenced by the smaller impact 
of male levels.  Second, Devarajan et al. (2001) find that investment in Africa might not be very productive and 
thus Klasen’s finding that reduced gender inequality in education boosts investment rates might not do much for 
growth there.  Klasen (2002) ran a separate growth regression for Africa and indeed also found that the impact of 
investment rates on growth was small and insignificant.  On the other hand, the total impact of gender inequality 
on economic growth was somewhat larger in Africa than elsewhere, suggesting that the direct effect and other 
pathways more than off-set the causal chain involving the investment rate.  But the general implication of both 
studies, that the effects of education and gender gaps in education differ from country to country, is clearly valid 
and our exercise is one that is based on average effects that might be larger or smaller in any individual country.       
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Table B: Empirical Results Used in Analysis 
 Growth Regressions Fertility, Child Mortality, Undernutrition 
Source Klasen (2002) Knowles et al. 
(2002) 
Abu-Ghaida and 
Klasen (2002) 
Schultz (1994) Smith and 
Haddad (1999) 
Regression 
Framework 
Cross-Country 
and Panel 
Growth 
Regression 
Cross-Country 
Level and Growth 
Regression 
Cross-Country 
Fertility and 
Child Mortality 
Regression 
Panel Fertility 
and Child 
Mortality 
Regressions 
Panel 
Undernutrition 
Regressions 
with fixed 
effects 
Education 
Variable 
Initial Female 
Male Ratio Gap 
in Total Years of 
Schooling and 
FMR of growth 
of schooling 
Log of female and 
male years of 
schooling 
Two 
specifications: (1) 
Male and female 
years of 
schooling (2) 
male and female-
male ratio of 
years of 
schooling  
Male and female 
years of 
schooling  
Female 
secondary 
school 
enrolment rate 
Control 
Variables 
Average 
education, 
growth of 
average 
education, 
openness, 
regional 
dummies, initial 
income 
Investment rates, 
population 
growth, country-
specific 
technology levels 
Per capita 
income, regional 
dummy variables 
Family planning 
score, trade 
surplus in fuels, 
urbanization, 
agricultural share 
of labor force, 
calories per 
capita 
Access to safe 
water, female-
male life 
expectancy 
ratio, calories 
per capita 
Preferred Point 
Estimate 
(standard error) 
Initial Gap: 1.64 
(0.73) 
Gap of Ed. 
Growth: 0.75 
(0.26) 
Level Regression: 
0.37 (0.103) 
Growth 
Regression: 0.21 
(0.07) 
 (1) Fertility: -
0.358 (0.130) 
Child mortality: -
18.102 (6.259) 
(2) Fertility: -
2.619 (0.496) 
Child mortality: -
142.377 (29.264) 
TFR (pooled): -
0.0824 (0.013) 
TFR (fixed 
effects): -0.131 
(0.025) 
Child Survival: 
0.145 (0.0033)  
-0.167 
(0.0633) 
Endogeneity 
Controls 
Yes Yes No No Yes 
Estimation 
Procedure 
OLS and TSLS OLS and TSLS  OLS OLS with fixed 
effects 
OLS and TSLS 
 
B. Fertility, Child Mortality, and Undernutrition 
There is a large number of empirical studies that have demonstrated the effect of female 
education, or gender inequality in education, on fertility.  Using macro level cross-country 
data, Subbarao and Raney (1995) find large negative effects of female enrollment rates in  
1970 on fertility in 1985 in models that control for a large number of other variables.  
Similarly, Schultz (1994) also uses cross-country panel data (with 2-3 observations per 
country) and finds that that the adult female years of schooling has a sizeable negative impact 
on fertility levels between 1972 and 1989.  He uses the dependent variable in a log form 
(while the independent variables are not in logs) and a pooled panel as well as a fixed effects 
specification.  His results suggests that a 1-year increase in the adult female years of 
schooling will reduce fertility by 8 percent in the pooled cross-section and by 13 percent in 
the fixed effects specification, which he prefers based on the relevant econometric tests.  
Schultz (1997) uses the same data but a number of different specifications (including fixed 
effects, reduced form estimates, instrumental variable estimation, with and without family 
planning scores) and finds that in most of the specifications one more year of female 
education reduces the total fertility rate by about 0.5 children per woman.  
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Gatti (1999) also uses cross-country panel data (which are more recent than Schultz’s) and 
finds that 1 year of female schooling reduces the total fertility rate by 0.32.  Klasen (1999) 
finds an effect of 0.23 in a cross-section regression for 1990.  In Table 5, we show a new 
specification of that model (where we exclude child mortality as a determinant of fertility in 
order to measure the total effect of female education on fertility, including the one operating 
via child mortality)17 and find that a 1-year increase in female years of schooling in 1990 
reduces the total fertility rate by 0.36, which is very close to the results found by Gatti (1999).  
When we use the ratio of female to male educational attainment instead of female education 
(to avoid the multicollinearity problem), the fit of the regression becomes considerably better 
as shown by the higher adjusted R-squared.  Increasing this ratio by 10 percentage points (e.g. 
from 60 percent to 70 percent) would reduce fertility by 0.26 children per woman.   
Thus the cross-country evidence is remarkably consistent with suggesting that one more 
year of female schooling reduces fertility by 0.3-0.5 children per woman and thus we are quite 
comfortable with using the estimates presented in Table 5 which are within this range.18  Male 
education, on the other hand, tends to have an insignificant or positive effect on fertility so 
that reducing the gender inequality by boosting female education is indeed the most important 
factor influencing fertility (Schultz, 1997). 
Apart from these cross-country studies, within-country studies have found similar effects.  
For example, Murthi et al. (1995) and Dreze and Murthi (2001) find that female education 
(they use female literacy as the indicator) has a significant effect on district-specific total 
fertility rates in India.  Moving from a female literacy rate of 22 percent to 65 percent would 
reduce total fertility by 1 child per woman (Dreze and Murthi, 2001). 
Finally, micro level studies have also supported this effect of female education on fertility.  
For example, data from the World Fertility Surveys shows that women with more than seven 
years of education have between 2-4 fewer children than women with no education 
(Summers, 1994; Schultz, 1997).19     
As we are here estimating impacts at the country level, it is probably most appropriate to 
rely on the cross-country estimates for measuring the effects of failing to meet the targets for 
gender equality in education.  Consequently, we will rely on the estimates presented in Table 
5 for our primary estimate but also compare the results to findings from Schultz (1994).   
Regarding child mortality (we use the under-five mortality rate as the indicator), there is 
also ample empirical evidence that higher female education reduces child mortality.  Using 
cross-country data for 1990, Klasen (1999) finds that the ratio of female to male total years of 
schooling has a highly significant and negative impact on the child mortality rate.  Using the 
same data, Table 5 shows that one more year of female education reduces the child mortality 
rate by 18.1 per 1000 in 1990.  Using the ratio of female to male schooling once again 
demonstrates a better fit and suggests that increasing the ratio of female to male educational 
attainment by 10 percentage points would reduce under-five mortality by 14.2 per 1000.20  
Schultz (1994) also uses his same panel data set to look at child survival rates (which is one 
minus the under-five mortality rate, expressed in percent)21 and finds that a 1-year increase in 
female educational attainment would increase child survival by about 1.5 percent.  Below we 
                                                 
17 In Klasen (1999), child mortality was included as an independent variable.  As shown in Table 5, child 
mortality itself is influenced by the gender gap in education so that the coefficient of 0.23 only measures the 
direct impact of the gender gap on fertility and omits the indirect linkage via child mortality.  By excluding child 
mortality, we thereby measure the total impact of the gender gap on fertility.   
18 They clearly do not represent the econometrically most sophisticated approach but yield results that are 
remarkably similar to much more sophisticated analyses on the subject.   
19 For a review of other studies documenting this linkage, see World Bank (2001). 
20 Klasen (2000), using female literacy as the educational variable, has very similar findings.   
21 For example, if the under five mortality rate was 100/1000, the child survival rate would be 900/1000; 
expressed in percent, this would be 90%.   
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will use his estimates as an alternative way to assess the costs.22  Schultz (1997) again uses 
different specifications which yield quite similar estimates suggesting that an additional year 
of female education reduces child mortality by 12-14/1000.      
Similarly strong evidence of the impact of female education on child mortality come from 
district-based data in India, presented by Murthi et al. (1995) and Dreze and Murthi (2001).  
Using micro data, Summers (1994) reports that the difference in under-five mortality rates 
between women with more than seven years of education and those with none is between 80 
and 120, which incidentally is quite consistent with the findings below in Table 5, which will 
form the basis for our estimation of the losses of failing to meet the goal on gender equality.23 
Regarding undernutrition, which is closely linked to child mortality, there is also 
considerable evidence that better female education reduces child undernutrition.  Smith and 
Haddad (1999), for example, show that female secondary school enrolments is significantly 
correlated with lower rates of childhood underweight (the share of children that are 
moderately or severely underweight) using cross-country panel data.  Using a specification 
with country fixed effects, 1 percentage point higher female secondary enrollment rate 
reduces the share of children who are underweight by 0.17 percentage points.  Klasen (2000) 
generates similar findings for the impact of female literacy on child undernutrition using 
cross-country panel data.  This linkage has also been found using micro data where gender 
inequality in education is an important part of overall female status which was found to be 
significantly and strongly (negatively) correlated with undernutrition rates  (Smith et al., 
2001). 
In sum, the theoretical and empirical literature discussed above suggests that there are 
plausible theoretical reasons and significant empirical support for the claim that reducing 
gender bias in education would enhance economic growth, and promote reductions in fertility, 
child mortality, and undernutrition.  Conversely, countries that do not make progress on 
closing the existing gaps are likely to suffer costs and improvements in these dimensions will 
be slower than they would be if they succeeded in closing the gaps.  The task is now to 
estimate these costs based on the findings above which is taken up in the next section. 
   
4. Current Status of Countries’ Progress towards the MDG on Gender Equality 
 
While ideally one would measure achievement of the MDG based on educational outcome 
measures (such as test scores or functional capacities of males and females) or at least output 
measures (such as completion rates), the most consistent, recent, and widely available data 
refers to school attendance and the resulting gross enrolment rates that can be calculated.   
The World Bank, as part of a larger exercise tracking progress towards all MDGs, uses the 
ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (where available) and then linearly 
projects the growth of enrolment that was achieved in the nineties up until 2005.  It then 
classifies developing countries according to whether they are on track (rank 1), slightly off 
track (rank 2), off track (rank 3), or seriously off track (rank 4) in terms of the achievement of 
gender parity in enrolments (see Table 1).24  Out of a total of 155 countries, 77 countries were 
found to be on track, 33 off track (ranging from slightly to seriously), and 45 lacked the 
necessary data.  Thus, approximately half of developing countries are indeed on track towards 
                                                 
22 We this time only use the results from the pooled panel data, not the fixed effects estimates which Schultz 
claims are poorly specified.  For a discussion, see Schultz (1994). 
23 For other studies, please refer to World Bank (2001). 
24 With some modifications, the World Bank classified countries as on track if the ratio of the number of years 
required to reach the goal to the number of years remaining was between 0 and 1; slightly off track if this ratio 
was between 1 and 2; off track if this ratio exceeded 2; and seriously off track if the country exhibited a decline 
in the ratio of girls to boys in school.  For example, if the latest available data for a country are from 1998 and so 
it has 7 years to reach the goal, and based on its 1990-98 growth rate for the ratio of girls to boys in school it 
would require 10 years to achieve gender parity, it would be classified as slightly off track (rank 2). 
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meeting this goal or already have equity in enrolments.  However, a significant portion of 
countries, approximately half the countries in each of the Middle East and North Africa, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, are on current trends unlikely to meet this goal and 
would have to, in some cases drastically, expand female enrolments to reach the goal by 2005.   
Table 1 also reports the latest available (mostly 1999) and projected 2005 gross enrolment 
rates at the primary and secondary levels for boys and girls, as well as the female to male 
ratios in enrolment.  Enrolments in 2005 are projected using the growth rate in enrolments 
between 1990 and 1999 (or the earliest and latest available UNESCO data in this range) with 
annual compounding.  We amend the World Bank’s assessment in two ways.  First, we do not 
use the ratio of girls to boys in school but the ratio of gross enrolment rates.  While the two 
methods are quite related (after all, our method divides by the number of boys and girls of 
school-going age and the differences in the number of boys and girls of school-going age in 
most countries are quite small), they differ in that the World Bank method also implicitly 
includes the problems of gender disparities at birth and in childhood in its assessment.  If a 
country like China has a large excess of males at birth (partly due to sex-specific abortions, 
see Klasen and Wink, 2002) and also some excess female mortality in childhood, there will be 
up to 15 percent more boys of school-going age than girls.  Requiring parity of the absolute 
number of girls and boys in school, as implicitly done in the World Bank method, would 
require higher enrolment rates for girls as there are fewer girls to start with.  While sex-
selective abortions and gender bias in mortality is a very serious problem that needs to be 
addressed in its own right (see Klasen and Wink, 2002), it appears problematic to conflate this 
with the MDG on gender equity in education.  Thus, we stick to the ratio of enrolment rates as 
our measure for the goal.25   
Secondly, we extend the analysis to countries that were not rated by the World Bank but 
for which the data on enrolments exist and we simply apply the World Bank’s method of 
rating but use the ratio of gross enrolment rates.  This way, we are able to rate another 25 
countries and find another 8 countries to be slightly off track and another 4 off-track.  Thus, 
we have a total of 22 countries that are slightly off-track, 14 that are off-track, and 9 countries 
that are seriously off-track, while the majority of developing countries (90) are actually 
projected to meet the goal. 
The finding that the majority of developing countries are projected to reach the goal is 
somewhat surprising but quite heartening.  Not only virtually all transition countries (with the 
exception of Tajikistan and Lithuania), but also almost all countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, in East Asia and the Pacific, the majority of countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa, half the countries in South Asia, and one-third of countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are projected to reach the goal.  Within South Asia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are 
projected to reach the goal, as is China in East Asia and Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Middle 
East.26   
Several caveats are in order.  First, we are using gross enrolment rates, defined as the 
number of pupils in a school form (e.g. primary or secondary school) divided by the number 
of children in the relevant age group (e.g. 6-12 for primary, 13-18 for secondary school).  It is 
easily possible, and in fact occurs frequently, for gross enrolment rates to exceed 100 percent, 
either due to poor progress within school, or late (early) entry of overage  (underage) children 
                                                 
25 Since we are using gross enrolment rates, a few caveats regarding our projected enrolments are in order.  
Countries with positive growth rates in enrolments are assumed not to exceed the gross enrolment rate of 115, 
which is deemed a rate compatible with universal enrolment.  In addition, countries with initial and final actual 
enrolment rates exceeding 100 that exhibit negative growth are assumed not to fall below the enrolment rate of 
100.  The assumption here is that these countries are moving closer to reducing repetition and over-aged 
enrolment and should not be penalized for this in the projections. 
26 The World Bank classified China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as a 2 while, based on our indicator, they are 
projected to meet the goal, and thus are rated 1.  The difference is precisely in the male excess in the school-age 
population in these countries due to a large excess of males at birth and some excess female mortality post-birth.   
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into school.   Thus, gender equity in gross enrolment rates could in theory be achieved by 
boys entering school on time and progressing quickly while girls enter later and progress 
poorly but nevertheless show a high gross enrolment rate.  Using net enrolment rates would 
address this matter but these are unfortunately not available in many countries.27   
Second, high enrolment rates (even net enrolment rates) do not have a one-to-one 
correspondence with subsequent high attainment rates.  The attainment rates are based on 
years passed and thus are an output measure of the educational process while the enrolment 
rates are merely an input measure.  High enrolment in the face of high failure rates will not 
boost attainment as much as high enrolment rates with low failure rates.   
Third, none of this says much about educational quality.  High enrolment rates can be 
accompanied by high or poor educational quality.  In fact, one can easily imagine that 
countries boosting enrolment rates (e.g. through the dropping of user fees as recently done in 
Lesotho or in Malawi in the early 1990s) may successfully raise enrolment rates but may face 
as a consequence declining quality as class sizes increase, resources per pupil fall, and the 
learning environment deteriorates.   Some of this might show up in attainment rates, but even 
those will not fully control for differences in educational quality.  We will not be able to say 
much about this issue in this paper but it is an important caveat to bear in mind.  In particular, 
it should caution against mechanically trying to reach the gross enrolment goals without 
ensuring that quality stays the same (or preferably improves), which will typically involve 
additional spending to match the increased enrolment rates. 
Fourth, many countries ranked as 1 (expected to meet the goal) have, in the past few 
years, expanded female enrolments considerably, often far more than male enrolments.  In 
this assessment, we are assuming that this differential expansion will continue for the coming 
years at the same pace as it has in the past 10 years.  This is not guaranteed and will therefore 
require constant monitoring and continuing effort to stay on this path towards meeting the 
goal.  In particular, specific additional policies may be required for those countries that are 
within 5 percentage points or less of reaching the goal.  To take an extreme example, female 
secondary enrolments in Bangladesh grew at 16.5 percent per year between 1990 and 1999 
while male secondary enrolments grew at 8.0 percent.  Bangladesh is meeting the goal if it 
continues this massive and female-biased expansion, but that will be far from given and one 
will have to monitor the countries ranked as 1 just as closely as those ranked 2, 3, and 4 since 
many might easily deviate from their projected path. 
Lastly, we focus here exclusively on the ability to reach gender equity in education, not on 
the development of overall education.  Some countries are reaching gender equity in 
education through declines in enrolments that are faster for males than females.  This is 
allowing them to meet the goal of gender equity, but takes them further from reaching the 
goal of education for all.  As such, they will suffer serious economic consequences of these 
reduced overall education levels.28  Thus, it is important to also investigate whether countries 
are experiencing rising or falling enrolment rates for both sexes.  We will comment on this 
below.             
With these caveats in mind, we will focus on those countries that are currently projected 
to fail to meet the MDG on gender equity for which we have complete data available (see 
below).  The vast majority of those come from Sub-Saharan Africa (17), with 4 countries 
from South Asia, and 1 from each of East Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa.  When assessing the costs of failing to 
meet the MDG on gender equality, it is clear that enrolment gaps per se do not impose 
                                                 
27 Even with gross enrolment rates, there are questions about data reliability.  Sometimes there are unusual jumps 
in gross enrolment rates and it is not always clear that they come from a consistent source.  Thus, the data will 
have to be scrutinized on an on-going basis.   
28 Klasen (2002) would allow an estimation of these effects as well since average education is included in the 
assessment.  But such an assessment is beyond the scope of this paper.   
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significant costs to society.29  It is the resulting gaps in educational attainment of the adult 
population that are the cause of the most significant costs, as all studies have found that the 
gap in educational attainment  of adults is the factor that reduces economic growth, or 
compromises progress on reducing fertility, undernutrition, and child mortality.   
Thus it is critical to estimate the impact of gaps in enrolments on subsequent gaps in 
achievement.  Given that gaps in enrolment will only over time lead to gaps in achievement,   
the failure to meet the MDG on gender equity in enrolments is imposing costs that will 
materialize with a delay.  Only when these uneducated girls turn into uneducated women do 
these costs begin to mount.  Thus, one would not expect very large costs to occur by 2005, the 
date when the goal is supposed to be met, but in the periods thereafter when uneducated 
female cohorts enter the adult age groups. 
Bearing the above in mind, our exercise must rely on the most widely available and 
current data, i.e. gross enrolment ratios, to derive education attainment data that can then be 
used in estimating the effects of the gender disparity in education on economic growth, 
fertility, and child mortality.  In order to establish the relationship between gross enrolment 
rates and education attainment, we use Barro and Lee’s latest (2000) education attainment and 
gross enrolment data, while restricting our analysis to the 78 developing countries in the 
dataset (as defined by the World Bank).  Barro and Lee’s enrolment figures are based on 
UNESCO data and are available at five-yearly intervals for 1960-95.30  Their attainment data, 
available at five-yearly intervals for 1960-2000, cover the female and male average years of 
primary and secondary schooling of the population aged 15 and over.31   We posit that, for 
females and males separately, current educational attainment of the adult population is a 
function of lagged education attainment, lagged enrolment rates, and the difference in current 
and lagged enrolment rates.  Therefore, we regress available attainment data on the above 
variables, allowing additionally for variation across countries and over time.  Unfortunately, 
we do not have attainment data for all the countries for which we have enrolment data and a 
ranking so that this assessment and our subsequent analysis of the costs can only be done for 
those countries with complete attainment data.   
Table 2a reports the results of these regressions, showing that for primary education, five-
year lagged attainment, ten-year lagged enrolments, and the difference between current and 
ten-year lagged enrolments are excellent predictors (adjusted R-squared of 0.96-0.98) of 
current attainment.  Even without any country or year fixed effects, we already are able to 
                                                 
29 In principle, one could think of some costs of these gaps in enrolment per se.  They could include that girls out 
of school are likely to marry earlier (possibly immediately after leaving school early) and thus have more 
children (see Baliga et al., 1999), or that girls out of school could be socially disruptive in some ways.  
Conversely, girls out of school could assist parents with generating income or helping in the household so that 
there might be some off-setting benefits.  But clearly the main issue is not the gaps in enrolment per se but the 
result of these gaps, which are gaps in attainment of adult women.   
30 Jong-Wha Lee kindly provided the average and female enrolment figures, and we generated the male 
enrolment figures using these and the sex ratio of the population aged below 15 years.  In their analysis, Barro 
and Lee cap their gross enrolment rates at 100 percent, but we use the uncapped data as we believe that 
enrolments above 100 percent will also impact attainments.  One should point out that the UNESCO figures that 
Barro and Lee employ are not identical to the UNESCO enrolment figures that the World Bank uses for 
assessing progress towards the MDGs.  The differences are based on revisions done by UNESCO and the World 
Bank.  While we think it best to use Barro and Lee’s enrolment figures to estimate the effects on attainment (for 
purposes of internal consistency), we apply the World Bank data as described above to project enrolments into 
the future and then estimate the costs.       
31 We should point out that we omit tertiary education in the assessment although the studies that estimated the 
impact of gender gaps in schooling always used total years of schooling of the adult population, which includes 
tertiary education.  We did this because the MDG is focused on gender gaps in primary and secondary education.  
Moreover, the data on tertiary education enrolments are scarce and not easily comparable across countries.  But 
this should not affect our results significantly as the average number of tertiary years of schooling of the adult 
population in virtually all developing countries is very small, certainly when compared to the much larger 
number of years of primary and secondary education.   
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explain virtually all variation in attainment rates, although adding country and year fixed 
effects improves our fit.  The coefficients are also highly significant and plausible in 
magnitude.32  For secondary education (Table 2b), five-year lags for enrolments are 
intuitively more appropriate (as it takes fewer years until they join the population of 15 and 
above) and fit the data considerably better.  In general, the regressions including the year 
effects mostly show lower coefficients on the regressors and therefore our projections will 
differ depending on the specification we use, although it is unclear whether these differences 
have an impact on the ratios of female to male schooling.  We will therefore use two 
specifications, i.e. those that only include country fixed effects and those that also include 
year fixed effects, and omit the simple regression since both country and year effects are 
significant and add to the explanatory power of our regression, which plausibly suggests that 
countries differ in translating enrolments into attainments.33  Tables 2a and 2b therefore 
provide us with the required link, by means of the coefficients on regressors, between 
education enrolment and attainment that we can now use to project attainment.   
In order to assess the impact of failing to achieve the gender equality MDG, it is necessary 
to project two scenarios for female education: the first relies on existing trends in enrolment 
and simply projects enrolment as described above and attainment using the regressions in 
Tables 2a and 2b.  The second scenario assumes the achievement of the MDG, stipulating that 
the average growth rate in female primary and secondary enrolment between 1995 and 2005 
is such that female enrolment is equal to male enrolment by 2005 and remains so thereafter.  
As mentioned above, gross enrolment data are available until 1999 at best, so that our first 
exercise is to project enrolment in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, adhering, where relevant, to 
the upper and lower bounds (see footnote 25).  Based on these projected enrolments and the 
regression results in Tables 2a and 2b, Tables 3a and 3b provide total projected primary and 
secondary years of schooling for males and females (using both country effects only as well 
as country and year effects combined) as well as target female years of schooling. 
Focusing first on the table for males (Table 3a) which reports actual 2000 total years of 
schooling as well as 2005 and 2015 projected years, there are, as expected, some differences 
in these projections depending on whether we use the regression with country effects only or 
additionally include year effects.34  The specification with country and year effects leads to 
slightly lower projected attainments in about 60 percent of the countries.  But in both 
specifications, there is a worryingly large number of countries that are projected to have 
declining educational attainment for males.  Therefore, of the 25 countries that are projected 
to be off-track and where data are complete, and accounting for country effects only, 6 
countries exhibit declining total male years of schooling: Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Central African Republic in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 
Iraq in the Middle East.  Male total years of schooling is projected to increase in the 
remaining 18 countries, roughly doubling between 2000 and 2015 in the case of Afghanistan, 
and tripling in the case of Mali and Guinea-Bissau. 
                                                 
32 Given that the right-hand side of the regression contains a lagged dependent variable, the error terms might be 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable thus biasing the coefficients.  Simulation studies have shown, 
however, that this bias largely affects the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, but not the other 
regressors.  As our results depend on the coefficients on lagged enrolments and change in enrolments, this 
econometric problem has little impact on our results.  For a discussion, see Forbes 2000.   
33 It is interesting to note that the year fixed effects mostly suggest that the attainments in later years are higher 
than in earlier years, even when controlling for the other covariates, suggesting that countries are increasingly 
better at turning enrolments into achievements which might be an indication of increasing productivity (i.e. 
declining failure and repetition rates) of the educational system.  When projecting forward attainments, we will 
assume that the year effects will be 0 in coming years, i.e. the educational productivity does not increase further 
beyond the left-out categories, which are 1995 and 2000.    
34 Please also note that there is some discontinuity between the 2000 attainment and the 2005 and 2015 
projections in a couple of countries.  This is probably due to the fact that our projections are based on the revised 
and updated UNESCO data and not the enrolment data Barro-Lee used in their attainment calculations.  
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Turning to Table 3b on female total years of schooling,  the same countries exhibiting 
declining male total years of schooling (with the exception of Iraq) are also projected to 
experience declining female attainment.  For all of these countries, target female total years of 
schooling are higher than projected years, for both 2005 and 2015.  For 2005, target years of 
schooling are higher than projected years for the remaining countries as well, i.e. those with 
projected increased female schooling.  In the case of the Gambia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and 
Liberia, the target female attainment is actually slightly smaller than the projected 
attainment.35  This is due to the fact that these countries show massive enrolment growth rates 
in the late 1990s.  Both this huge growth rate (mostly due to recent 1999 figures) is suspect, as 
is the assumption that it would continue unchanged until 2005, so that it is likely that these 
countries will continue to exhibit gender gaps in education.  However, the magnitude of these 
gaps is difficult to assess without resorting to essentially arbitrary alternative assumptions 
about the true enrolment figures for 1999 and their growth thereafter.  We therefore retain 
these countries as countries likely to fail to meet the MDG and suffer costs, but cannot assess 
the magnitude of these costs.  Additionally,  for 2015, Ghana and Pakistan exhibit target 
schooling years that are lower than projected years, i.e. they will overshoot the goal of gender 
parity in education between 2005 and 2015.  Therefore, for the countries that are overshooting 
the target by 2005 (i.e., the Gambia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) or 2015 (Ghana and 
Pakistan additionally), it will not be necessary to calculate the costs of failing to meet the goal 
for these years. 
 
 
5. Costs of Failing to Meet the MDG on Gender Equality 
 
A. Economic Growth 
It may be important to preface the presentation of the results with some caveats regarding 
the interpretation of the expected effects.  First, these estimates are based on average effects 
found in cross-country regressions.  While they would thus be a plausible projection of effects 
for any individual country, it may well be that the actual effect may be larger or smaller for 
any individual country.  Deviations from the these average expected effects are also not likely 
to be random but related to the policy, educational, and institutional environment of a country.  
For example, in countries where the overall policy and institutional environment is not 
conducive to economic growth, more female education is unlikely to deliver much higher 
growth either.36  Similarly, in countries where female employment and economic activities are 
highly circumscribed, the positive effects of female education might not materialize to the 
same extent.  Conversely, in countries where the policy and institutional environment is 
conducive to economic growth, removing the bottleneck of poor female human capital might 
well have a much larger effect than estimated here.  After all, the effects are estimated based 
on the policy and institutional setting from 1960-1990 and thus the average effect include 
many countries with poor policies and institutional frameworks as well as high growth 
countries.     
Secondly, as these effects are based on historical assessment of the impact of female and 
male education on economic growth, they implicitly take into account differences in type or 
                                                 
35 The reason these countries are still rated a 2 or 3 is the fact that enrolment rates in 2005, while exceeding 100 
percent for both females and males, are still significantly larger for males.  But since we cap enrolments at 115 
percent for both before calculating the costs, there are no gender differences and thus no costs. 
36 For a discussion of this and related issues see Pritchett (2001) and Devarajan et al. (2001).  There is some 
interesting evidence, however, that greater female education as well as women’s economic and political 
participation might actually improve the institutional environment (and particularly reduce corruption) which 
might help improve the overall growth performance.  For evidence, see World Bank (2001).   
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quality of education, including particularly also gender-streaming into fields of study within 
educational systems in many countries.  If the female expansion in education implied by the 
target scenario would be entirely constrained to typical female occupations, one might expect 
that the growth effects will materialize to a lesser extent; conversely, if this expansion allows 
women to enter all fields of education and occupations, the effects may well be significantly 
larger.   
Based on Klasen (2002) and Knowles et al. (2002), as discussed above, Tables 4a-d 
outline the impact on economic growth of achieving gender parity in education.  Due to 
missing data on attainments, we are only able to project the effects for 25 countries.  In Tables 
4a-b, we use the projected attainments based on the country effects only regression in Tables 
2a and 2b (and thus the corresponding attainment figures from Tables 3a and 3b).  For the 
estimates based on Klasen (2002) we use the coefficient from the reduced form regression of 
the ratio of female to male expansion of education (0.75) to see whether a faster growth of 
female attainment, that would be consistent with meeting the target, would lead to higher 
growth in the period 1995-2005.37  To estimate the impact of meeting the target between 2005 
and 2015, we calculate the effect that would obtain from already having a higher ratio of 
female to male attainment in 2005, and of possibly having a higher female to male ratio in the 
growth of education between 2005 and 2015.  For the effects based on Knowles et al. (2002), 
we use the impact higher female education would have on long-term per capita GDP.  As they 
used a 30-year time span to estimate these long-run relationships, we similarly use such a time 
span and thus estimate the effect of reduced gender gaps in education on average income 
levels between 1975-2005  and on growth between 1975 and 2005, and do the same for the 
period 1985-2015.  We list the countries according to their rank.  We are expecting the largest 
effects in the countries ranked as a 4, and progressively smaller effects for countries ranked 3 
or 2.   
Beginning with column 3 in Table 4a, we find that the growth effects of meeting the goal 
are considerable in the countries that are currently off-track.  Most countries in categories 3 
and 4 would have grown faster by 0.1-0.3 percentage points between 1995 and 2005 if they 
had embarked on a path to meet the goal in 1995.  In the period 2005-2015, the effects 
become significantly larger, averaging around 0.4 percentage points per year for countries in 
categories 3 and 4.38 
In short, we are observing sizable losses for countries that are failing to meet the goal of 
gender equity in education by 2005.  If these figures of 0.1-0.3 percent in annual growth 
appear small, one has to remember the power of compounding.  A country with a PPP-GDP 
per capita of $1500 in 1995 and a projected per capita growth rate of 1 percent per year (both 
typical values for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) between 1995 and 2015 would have 
10 percent higher income in 2015 if the effect of failing to meet the goal was 0.4 percentage 
points in both 10-year periods.   Also, one should bear in mind that many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa have experienced no or negative growth in the past.  In that context, even such 
a seemingly small effect would ensure that many countries could return to positive growth or 
significantly increase their existing growth potential.   
                                                 
37 We do not have to consider the impact of a higher initial ratio for this time period as the ratio in 1995 is the 
same regardless of whether countries embark after 1995 to reach the goal or not.    
38 We do not report the results for Iraq for 1995-2005 and for India between 2005-2015  since they are 
implausibly large due to a peculiarity of the construction of the gender gap variable in Klasen (2002).  The 
reason for this is that the projected male expansion of schooling 1995-2005 (2005-2015) is very small  so that 
increasing the female expansion has a huge impact on the female-male ratio of expansion of education and  thus 
generates a huge growth effect.  Thus, these results are entirely driven by the use of the ratio in the regression 
and the very small denominator and should therefore be discounted.  This problem also appears, to a lesser 
extent, in Cameroon for 1995-2005, and in Turkey for both periods.  Thus, those effects should be treated with 
some caution and may well be biased upward.   
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Turning to the calculations based on Knowles et al. (2002), they confirm the sizable 
impact of failing to reach the goal on gender inequality.  In fact, if anything, most measured 
effects appear to be larger than the ones based on Klasen (2002).  Were  countries to meet the 
goal of gender equity in enrolments, their average 1975-2005 GDP per capita levels would be 
up to 15  percent larger.  For 1985-2015, the effect would also reach up to 14 percent.  As 
with the estimates based on Klasen (2002), the effect would be largest for countries 
categorized as groups 3 or 4, and comparatively small for those in group 2.39  The growth 
estimates based on Knowles yield even larger effects, but they should be treated with some 
caution as they are not their preferred estimates (see above). 
Table 4a also uses the Klasen specification but considers, as was done in Klasen (2002), a 
30-year period rather than a 10-year period.  Now the effects are predictably smaller but one 
has to bear in mind that the smaller effects would be compounded over a longer time period.  
As a result, the findings are really quite similar to those discussed above. 
Table 4c considers country and year effects for calculating attainments which we saw led 
to somewhat different projected attainments in Tables 3a and 3b.  The effects of failing to 
meet the goal are, however, very similar and consistent with the findings in Table 4a, both 
when just a 10-year horizon or when a 30-year horizon is examined.  Using the Knowles 
specification also leads to quite similar results so that the four approaches presented converge 
on identifying considerable losses to countries that are failing to meet the goal of gender 
equity in education.   
In sum, these results suggest that countries failing to meet the goal of gender equity in 
education will suffer losses in terms of economic growth.  The point estimates differ 
according to specification but converge on suggesting that the countries that are seriously off 
track will suffer the most. 
B. Fertility, Child Mortality, and Undernutrition 
Apart from investigating the effects on economic growth, we also examine what the costs 
of failing to meet the goal are in terms of foregone reductions in fertility, child mortality, and 
malnutrition.  Here again, we use the average effects found in the studies discussed above and 
apply them to countries.  The effects may differ from country to country, although the size of 
the effect of female education on fertility, child mortality, and undernutrition appears to be 
much more similar across regions of the world and less dependent on the overall policy and 
institutional environment.  This is not surprising given that, in contrast to growth, fertility, 
child mortality, and undernutrition depend much more on the situation of households rather 
than the overall policy environment.  Thus we have more confidence in applying these 
average effects to individual countries.   
The fertility and child mortality estimates are based, in the first instance, on the 
regressions presented in Table 5, particularly the equations using the female/male ratio of the 
total years of schooling (equations 2 and 4).  In addition, we consider the specification and 
results by Schultz (1994) to compare these effects.  For the reductions in malnutrition, we rely 
on our female secondary enrolments predictions and the results from Smith and Haddad 
(1999). 
In Tables 6a-d, the results are presented using country effects only and country and year 
effects combined to estimate the losses.  Since the two specifications give very similar results, 
we focus here again on the results based on country effects only (Table 6a).  In 2005, the 
number of births per woman would be reduced by 0.1-0.4 children per woman if countries 
met the goal of gender equity.  Once again, the effects are largest in the category 4 countries, 
                                                 
39 Due to the different specification, there is no perfect correlation between the two estimates.  Since the 
Knowles et al. specification is based on elasticities, it will report particularly large effects in countries that 
currently have low female education such as Afghanistan.  
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while they are smaller in the other countries.  By 2015, the effects would rise to up to 0.6 
fewer children per woman.   
In terms of child mortality, the effects are also sizable.  Meeting the goal would reduce 
child mortality by up to 24 children per 1000 in Afghanistan (a seriously off-track country) in 
2005.  By 2015 the effects would mount to 20-32 children per 1000 in a number of countries.  
Thus, meeting the goal would greatly assist countries in meeting the MDG on child mortality, 
which, for some countries, might be very difficult to reach without the help of having first 
eliminated the gender gap in schooling.  For example, in Afghanistan and Mali, where the 
effect of gender equity in education in 2005 leads to a reduction of child mortality by 24 and 
14 children per 1000 respectively, the achievement of the goal would save the lives of 
approximately 110,000 children in Afghanistan and 35,000 children in Mali (based on current 
UN projections for the population aged 0-4 years, and assuming constant fertility rates40).  In 
India, the number of children whose death could be averted reaches 435,000 per year, based 
on a reduction of child mortality by 3 deaths per 1000. 
In Tables 7a-b, we use the Schultz (1994) specification to examine the impact of meeting 
the goal on fertility and child mortality.  The results of the fertility regression are larger when 
the fixed effect specification is used.  Overall they are remarkably similar to the findings in 
Tables 6a and 6b and also suggest considerable costs in terms of fertility for failing to meet 
the goal.  The results for child mortality show somewhat smaller effects but still on the order 
of magnitude suggested by the earlier results.  In terms of annually averted child deaths, given 
current demographic conditions, the number for Afghanistan is 31,000, for Mali 5,000, and 
for India 240,000.   
The effects of closing the gender gap on malnutrition rates (i.e. the share of children under 
five years of age who are moderately or severely underweight) are particularly large, as 
shown in Table 8.  If countries would meet the MDG on gender equity by 2005, malnutrition 
rates would be lower by several percentage points already in 2005 in half the countries, and 
the effect would be even larger thereafter.  Also here, those most seriously off-track would 
benefit the most from boosting female education.  Closing the gender gap in education would 
therefore play a significant role in helping to meet the MDG on poverty, which includes 
halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger as its second target, and specifically 
the prevalence of underweight children.41   
Clearly, failing to meet the goal of gender equity in education will not only hurt the girls 
who lose an opportunity for an education, but also impose societal costs in terms of lower 
growth, higher fertility, child mortality, and malnutrition.  There are likely to be other losses 
in areas not investigated here, such as curtailing educational investments of the next 
generation and reducing girls’ vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, given that girls and young women 
are highly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, and a lack of education makes them more so.42   
 
                                                 
40 Of course, the same expansion in female education might lead to a change in the demographic conditions by 
2005 and thus change the actual number of excess deaths in the countries missing the target.   
41 The undernutrition estimate is based on a different educational variable than the one used for the other effects.  
While the others all refer to the gender gap in schooling attainments, the undernutrition result is based on a study 
that uses female secondary enrolments (Smith and Haddad, 1999).  The advantage of this is that it is available for 
more countries.  The disadvantage is that secondary enrolments are used as a proxy for educational attainment as 
it is likely that not enrolments per se but higher attainment among adult women will lead to reduced 
undernutrition.  Since change in enrolments is only an imperfect proxy of change in attainment, these results 
should be treated with some caution.    
42 Girls are at greater risk than boys because of gender inequalities in status, power, and access to resources, and 
they are particularly vulnerable to contracting AIDS for social, cultural, economic, and even physiological 
reasons (World Bank, 2002).  Of course, the epidemic also reduces girls’ access to education, since girls are 
more likely than boys to be retained at home for domestic work when household income drops due to AIDS 
deaths, or to care for sick relatives.  Yet girls’ education can go far in slowing and reversing the spread of HIV 
by contributing to female empowerment and economic independence, delayed marriage, and family planning.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we took the insights of recent findings about the effects of gender gaps in 
education on economic growth and on fertility, child mortality, and undernutrition to estimate 
the losses that countries are likely to suffer if they do not meet the MDG of equity in primary 
and secondary education by 2005.  Using different specifications and different ways to 
translate the failure to reach the enrolment goal into attainment gaps, we find that the 
countries failing to meet the goal will indeed suffer significant losses in terms of foregone 
economic growth as well as smaller progress in reducing levels of fertility, child mortality, 
and undernutrition.  Point estimates suggest that the countries that are currently seriously off 
track might lose 0.1-0.3 percentage points in annual economic growth between 1995 and 
2005, and an average of 0.4 percentage points between 2005 and 2015.  In addition, failing to 
meet the goal would lead to 0.1-0.6 more children per woman by 2015 and to higher child 
mortality of up to 32 per 1000 depending on how far the countries are from meeting the goal.  
Sensitivity analyses using results from different studies show that these results are quite 
robust to different specifications of the effects as well as to different approaches of turning 
enrolments into educational attainments.  Thus, promoting female education to close these 
gaps is not only intrinsically valuable for the girls who would benefit and would further an 
important aspect of gender equity in developing countries, but it would assist in the overall 
development of these countries as well.  From this point of view, there are high returns to 
investing heavily to meet this goal and ensure that it is not only met in its quantitative 
dimensions but also will be accompanied by improvements in completion rates and the quality 
of education made available.   
While there are other valuable investment opportunities for public funds, investing in 
female education to reduce the existing gender gaps is one of the most worthwhile 
investments available to governments.  This is not only shown by the results above but also 
by analyses of rates of return which show that the marginal social rates of return to female 
education are very large, and in fact considerably larger than the marginal returns of investing 
in male education in countries exhibiting considerable gender gaps.43  Recent studies by the 
World Bank (2001) and Bruns and Mingat (2002) also show that this goal is, given some 
increased donor support, affordable even for poor developing countries, suggesting that it is 
not only worthwhile but within reach for policy-makers in countries that are currently not 
likely to meet it.    
While focusing on gender equity in education as a high priority, one should not lose sight 
of overall educational achievements.  As shown above, many countries are currently 
experiencing stagnating or even declining educational enrolments.  Reaching gender equity in 
the face of these declining overall enrolments is valuable, but clearly the goal must be to push 
for gender equity at high overall levels of enrolments.  Thus for those countries, the decline in 
enrolments must be halted and reversed and educational opportunities must be expanded for 
all, but the expansion should be faster for females than for males to close the remaining gaps.    
                                                 
43 This is shown, for example, in Alderman et al. (1995) and in other studies summarized by World Bank (2001).  
These studies show that even the marginal private returns are larger for girls’ than for boys’ education in 
countries with considerable gender gaps in education.  While the private returns to the same level of education 
are typically larger for boys, the marginal returns are still higher for girls as they are at a much lower level of 
education and there is clear evidence of diminishing returns.  When the indirect effects of female education are 
considered, the marginal social returns of female education increase considerably.  For a discussion, see 
Alderman et al. (1995) and World Bank (2001).   
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Table 1: Latest Available and Projected 2005 Primary and Secondary Gross Enrolment Rates for Boys and Girls
Country
Meeting 
goal? *
Revised 
Ranking**
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Afghanistan 4 4 34 69 12 32 0.50 0.36 83 115 31 115 0.72 0.27
Albania 1 1 109 110 77 75 0.99 1.03 115 115 80 69 1.00 1.17
Algeria 1 1 110 119 69 65 0.92 1.07 115 115 82 63 1.00 1.30
American Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Angola .. 2 60 69 13 18 0.87 0.77 46 56 17 19 0.83 0.85
Antigua and Barbuda 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Argentina 1 1 119 119 97 91 1.00 1.07 115 115 115 107 1.00 1.07
Armenia .. 1 90 85 79 100 1.06 0.79 73 62 56 115 1.17 0.49
Azerbaijan 1 1 99 97 80 80 1.02 1.00 91 88 75 74 1.04 1.01
Bahrain 1 1 103 102 105 99 1.00 1.06 100 100 108 100 1.00 1.08
Bangladesh 1 1 105 108 56 52 0.97 1.08 115 115 115 84 1.00 1.37
Belarus 1 1 109 112 93 96 0.98 0.97 115 115 91 99 1.00 0.92
Belize 1 1 125 130 72 72 0.96 1.00 115 115 99 108 1.00 0.92
Benin .. 3 69 103 14 30 0.67 0.45 102 115 21 44 0.89 0.48
Bhutan .. .. 19 22 8 10 0.85 0.80 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Bolivia .. 1 115 117 76 81 0.98 0.93 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina .. 1 74 74 69 69 1.00 1.00 80 79 75 75 1.01 1.00
Botswana 1 1 109 109 85 78 1.00 1.09 102 109 115 115 0.94 1.00
Brazil 1 1 162 170 109 98 0.95 1.11 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Bulgaria 1 1 102 105 91 93 0.97 0.98 106 109 102 109 0.97 0.94
Burkina Faso 3 3 35 51 8 12 0.70 0.64 43 58 11 15 0.75 0.72
Burundi 2 2 56 69 6 8 0.80 0.75 49 63 9 9 0.78 0.94
Cambodia .. 2 95 109 12 22 0.87 0.55 87 100 9 14 0.87 0.64
Cameroon 2 2 84 98 17 22 0.85 0.78 78 92 13 16 0.85 0.85
Cape Verde .. 1 143 145 51 52 0.98 0.97 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Central African Republic .. 3 45 68 6 14 0.66 0.41 41 59 4 10 0.69 0.45
Chad 4 4 53 87 5 18 0.61 0.28 72 96 8 22 0.75 0.36
Chile 1 1 105 109 88 87 0.96 1.02 108 115 97 99 0.94 0.98
China 2 1 108 105 60 66 1.02 0.90 100 100 75 74 1.00 1.02
Colombia 1 1 112 113 75 67 1.00 1.11 114 115 94 86 1.00 1.10
Comoros .. 2 76 91 18 23 0.84 0.82 87 94 22 24 0.93 0.95
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 2 44 49 13 24 0.90 0.52 34 32 11 20 1.07 0.56
Congo, Rep. 2 2 79 88 43 60 0.90 0.72 59 65 43 57 0.91 0.75
Costa Rica 1 1 106 109 54 48 0.97 1.12 110 114 63 54 0.96 1.17
Cote d'Ivoire .. 3 66 88 15 28 0.74 0.53 73 95 16 27 0.77 0.58
Croatia 1 1 89 91 86 83 0.99 1.04 93 94 90 90 0.98 1.00
Cuba 1 1 102 106 84 80 0.96 1.04 106 111 77 78 0.95 0.98
Czech Republic 1 1 104 104 89 87 0.99 1.02 109 110 88 84 0.99 1.05
Djibouti 4 2 31 43 17 13 0.73 1.29 31 41 24 12 0.75 2.02
Dominica 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Dominican Republic 1 1 123 126 73 60 0.97 1.22 115 115 100 87 1.00 1.15
Ecuador 1 1 114 114 57 56 0.99 1.02 112 112 58 57 1.00 1.01
1999 or latest available 2005 projections
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Country
Meeting 
goal? *
Revised 
Ranking**
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 1 96 104 81 86 0.93 0.94 103 105 90 88 0.98 1.03
El Salvador 1 1 109 113 50 50 0.97 0.99 115 115 84 90 1.00 0.94
Equatorial Guinea 4 .. 112 137 19 43 0.82 0.44 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Eritrea 4 4 55 67 23 33 0.82 0.70 71 85 35 59 0.83 0.59
Estonia 1 1 101 105 108 105 0.96 1.03 100 100 110 111 1.00 0.99
Ethiopia 4 4 57 85 4 6 0.67 0.68 95 115 2 3 0.82 0.62
Fiji .. 1 110 111 70 70 0.99 1.01 100 100 96 99 1.00 0.97
Gabon 1 1 151 152 51 58 0.99 0.87 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia, The 2 2 71 79 23 31 0.90 0.74 88 81 35 36 1.09 0.97
Georgia 1 1 98 99 78 77 1.00 1.02 99 99 70 67 1.00 1.05
Ghana .. 2 74 82 33 42 0.89 0.78 79 83 37 40 0.95 0.94
Grenada 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guatemala 2 2 94 105 30 35 0.89 0.87 112 115 38 44 0.97 0.87
Guinea 4 4 51 75 7 20 0.68 0.36 84 97 10 26 0.87 0.39
Guinea-Bissau .. 3 66 99 14 26 0.67 0.54 94 115 26 43 0.82 0.61
Guyana 1 1 115 117 82 80 0.98 1.02 115 115 78 80 1.00 0.97
Haiti .. 1 155 153 28 30 1.01 0.92 115 115 46 52 1.00 0.88
Honduras .. 1 110 107 35 29 1.03 1.23 108 108 33 27 1.00 1.20
Hungary 1 1 103 104 99 98 0.98 1.01 108 111 115 114 0.97 1.01
India 3 3 92 109 40 59 0.85 0.68 99 108 46 62 0.91 0.75
Indonesia 1 1 106 110 54 56 0.97 0.95 101 105 65 62 0.96 1.05
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2 1 86 89 77 83 0.96 0.92 75 74 107 99 1.00 1.08
Iraq 3 4 91 111 29 47 0.82 0.62 85 106 25 41 0.80 0.60
Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Jamaica 1 1 102 96 82 85 1.07 0.96 103 92 94 103 1.12 0.91
Jordan 1 1 101 101 89 86 1.00 1.03 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Kazakhstan 1 1 96 96 87 87 1.01 1.01 103 102 80 81 1.01 0.99
Kenya 1 1 90 91 28 31 0.98 0.90 87 87 37 35 1.00 1.05
Kiribati 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Korea, Rep. 1 1 99 98 97 98 1.01 1.00 95 94 104 102 1.02 1.01
Kyrgyz Republic 1 1 100 103 84 82 0.97 1.03 100 100 71 70 1.00 1.03
Lao PDR 3 2 106 124 29 42 0.85 0.70 115 115 39 51 1.00 0.77
Latvia 1 1 100 102 90 88 0.98 1.03 105 107 88 85 0.98 1.04
Lebanon 1 1 98 102 82 75 0.96 1.09 87 100 86 78 0.87 1.10
Lesotho 1 1 108 99 32 24 1.09 1.37 100 98 34 26 1.02 1.29
Liberia .. 3 99 137 18 27 0.73 0.69 115 115 32 33 1.00 1.00
Libya 1 1 116 118 84 75 0.99 1.11 115 115 80 68 1.00 1.19
Lithuania 1 4 100 101 71 115 0.99 0.61 109 107 59 115 1.02 0.52
Macedonia, FYR 1 1 102 104 80 82 0.98 0.97 105 109 115 115 0.97 1.00
Madagascar 1 1 100 104 14 15 0.96 0.96 98 105 11 12 0.93 0.95
Malawi .. 1 158 158 40 50 1.00 0.80 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Malaysia 1 1 100 102 104 94 0.98 1.10 105 109 115 115 0.97 1.00
1999 or latest available 2005 projections
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Country
Meeting 
goal? *
Revised 
Ranking**
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Maldives 1 1 134 133 44 41 1.01 1.07 115 132 40 37 0.87 1.10
Mali 3 3 45 65 10 20 0.70 0.52 95 115 21 38 0.83 0.54
Marshall Islands 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mauritania 1 2 82 87 15 21 0.94 0.72 115 115 23 23 1.00 0.96
Mauritius 1 1 109 108 106 108 1.00 0.98 108 108 115 115 1.00 1.00
Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mexico 1 1 113 114 75 72 0.99 1.04 113 113 94 88 1.00 1.06
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Moldova 1 1 97 98 82 79 0.99 1.03 103 106 80 83 0.97 0.96
Mongolia 1 1 100 97 71 58 1.04 1.23 102 97 62 48 1.05 1.29
Morocco 2 2 83 98 35 44 0.84 0.80 109 113 39 46 0.96 0.85
Mozambique 4 3 73 98 11 17 0.75 0.68 86 115 18 24 0.74 0.76
Myanmar 1 1 91 91 35 35 0.99 1.00 82 82 51 51 1.01 1.01
Namibia 1 1 114 112 63 56 1.02 1.12 102 106 75 72 0.96 1.04
Nepal 2 2 112 140 45 62 0.80 0.72 115 115 78 76 1.00 1.02
Nicaragua .. 1 105 104 65 55 1.01 1.19 111 114 82 76 0.97 1.08
Niger 3 3 26 39 5 8 0.67 0.65 30 40 6 7 0.75 0.89
Nigeria .. 2 74 89 27 33 0.83 0.82 68 72 40 42 0.95 0.94
Oman 1 1 71 75 67 68 0.95 0.98 65 66 95 83 0.98 1.15
Pakistan .. 3 74 117 32 46 0.63 0.70 113 115 53 61 0.98 0.87
Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Panama .. 1 108 111 71 67 0.97 1.07 111 113 76 71 0.98 1.06
Papua New Guinea 3 2 80 88 18 24 0.91 0.78 94 97 32 35 0.97 0.89
Paraguay 1 1 111 115 58 56 0.97 1.04 115 115 87 84 1.00 1.04
Peru 1 1 127 128 78 83 0.99 0.94 115 115 94 96 1.00 0.98
Philippines .. 1 113 113 79 73 1.00 1.09 115 113 86 72 1.01 1.19
Poland 1 1 99 102 98 99 0.97 0.99 101 105 109 114 0.96 0.96
Puerto Rico .. 1 129 129 68 63 1.00 1.08 115 115 76 70 1.00 1.08
Romania 1 1 101 103 81 80 0.98 1.01 108 112 74 72 0.97 1.03
Russian Federation .. 1 84 85 85 79 0.99 1.07 71 72 78 72 0.99 1.08
Rwanda 1 1 121 124 12 12 0.98 0.95 115 115 17 15 1.00 1.11
Samoa 1 1 101 104 80 73 0.97 1.09 100 100 115 115 1.00 1.00
Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Saudi Arabia 2 1 67 70 65 72 0.96 0.90 66 65 91 94 1.03 0.97
Senegal 3 3 68 78 15 24 0.87 0.64 83 86 20 26 0.97 0.76
Seychelles 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sierra Leone .. 2 63 68 22 26 0.92 0.82 83 74 31 30 1.12 1.04
Slovak Republic 1 1 102 103 87 86 0.99 1.02 103 109 88 85 0.94 1.03
Solomon Islands .. 2 92 102 14 22 0.91 0.65 115 115 21 30 1.00 0.69
Somalia .. 4 7 13 4 7 0.52 0.53 6 11 3 6 0.53 0.53
South Africa 1 1 117 121 95 86 0.96 1.10 114 120 106 99 0.95 1.07
Sri Lanka 1 1 104 107 74 70 0.97 1.07 104 108 72 69 0.97 1.05
St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
1999 or latest available 2005 projections
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Country
Meeting 
goal? *
Revised 
Ranking**
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
Female 
primary 
enrolment
Male 
primary 
enrolment
Female 
secondary 
enrolment
Male 
secondary 
enrolment
Female/male 
primary 
ratio
Female/male 
secondary 
ratio
St. Lucia 1 1 111 117 104 85 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
St. Vincent & the Grenadi .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sudan 2 1 51 59 36 22 0.85 1.67 55 59 52 19 0.93 2.76
Suriname .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Swaziland 1 1 121 128 60 60 0.95 1.01 115 115 80 77 1.00 1.04
Syrian Arab Republic 2 1 99 108 39 44 0.91 0.89 96 103 36 34 0.93 1.05
Tajikistan .. 4 101 109 70 82 0.93 0.86 108 115 54 71 0.94 0.77
Tanzania 1 1 63 63 5 6 1.00 0.86 60 58 5 6 1.02 0.98
Thailand 1 1 91 96 80 78 0.95 1.02 87 93 115 115 0.94 1.00
Togo 3 3 109 139 22 50 0.78 0.44 115 115 34 64 1.00 0.53
Tonga 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 103 105 82 75 0.99 1.09 108 110 82 73 0.98 1.12
Tunisia 1 1 115 121 76 73 0.95 1.04 115 115 115 94 1.00 1.22
Turkey 3 2 96 106 48 67 0.91 0.71 96 108 57 75 0.89 0.76
Turkmenistan .. 1 109 109 112 112 1.00 0.99 115 115 115 115 1.00 1.00
Uganda .. 2 136 146 10 16 0.93 0.59 115 115 9 15 1.00 0.65
Ukraine 1 1 81 82 99 87 0.99 1.15 74 76 103 83 0.98 1.24
Uruguay 1 1 111 113 99 84 0.99 1.17 114 115 105 94 0.99 1.11
Uzbekistan .. 1 79 81 89 100 0.97 0.89 77 81 80 94 0.96 0.85
Vanuatu 1 1 122 113 26 31 1.08 0.83 115 115 38 43 1.00 0.88
Venezuela, RB 1 1 101 103 65 54 0.98 1.19 104 109 89 82 0.95 1.08
Vietnam .. 1 104 111 61 68 0.94 0.91 107 115 97 109 0.94 0.89
West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Yemen, Rep. 4 3 56 98 25 69 0.56 0.37 88 115 32 52 0.77 0.62
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 1 1 67 65 62 59 1.02 1.05 63 62 60 57 1.02 1.06
Zambia .. 2 76 81 22 29 0.94 0.77 66 70 26 28 0.94 0.95
Zimbabwe 1 1 95 98 43 48 0.97 0.88 84 87 40 45 0.96 0.90
* As assessed by the World Bank, based on the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education, where "1" denotes on track, "2" slightly off track, "3" off track, and "4" seriously off track.
The World Bank's methodology uses, with some modification, the ratio of years it takes to reach the goal divided by the years available (i.e. between latest data and 2005).   
If this ratio is >0 and <1, the ranking is "1", if >1 and <2, the ranking is "2", if >2, the ranking is "3", and if the ratio of girls to boys in school is declining, the ranking is "4".  
** Based on the ratio for girls to boys of gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary education, and otherwise following the World Bank's methodology.  Since we apply this approach to  
the ratio of enrollment rates rather than the ratio of students in school, any discrepancies in ranking are the result of the slight difference in the number of boys and girls of school-going age in most countries.
Since the ratio is an average for primary and secondary enrollment, in the following cases it masks large discrepancies between the primary and secondary levels:
Armenia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Iraq, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Uganda.  However, only in the case of Armenia does it lead to an "on track" ranking
where not both the primary and secondary level are on track separately.
Source: World Development Indicators central database and authors' calculations.
1999 or latest available 2005 projections
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Table 2a: Primary Level
Dependent variable: average years of primary schooling in population aged 15 or above 
Constant 0.026 0.163 *** 0.806 * 0.082 0.414 * 1.598 *
(0.039) (0.089) (0.178) (0.065) (0.146) (0.240)
Five-year lagged attainment 0.952 * 0.767 * 0.635 * 0.941 * 0.693 * 0.476 *
(0.012) (0.035) (0.047) (0.013) (0.038) (0.050)
Ten-year lagged enrolment 0.379 * 0.771 * 0.503 * 0.336 * 0.779 * 0.404 **
(0.066) (0.141) (0.149) (0.081) (0.181) (0.184)
Difference between current and 0.402 * 0.417 * 0.234 *** 0.413 * 0.589 * 0.358 **
ten-year lagged enrolment (0.088) (0.119) (0.122) (0.099) (0.147) (0.145)
Year 1970 -0.271 * -0.443 *
(0.073) (0.081)
Year 1975 -0.247 * -0.366 *
(0.063) (0.069)
Year 1980 -0.095 *** -0.186 *
(0.055) (0.062)
Year 1985 -0.126 * -0.142 *
(0.047) (0.054)
Year 1990 0.002 -0.024 *
(0.044) (0.052)
No. of observations 409 409 409 404 404 404
Adjusted R-squared 0.977 0.979 0.980 0.956 0.960 0.964
F test, country effects jointly zero 1.445 ** 1.757 * 1.534 * 2.159 *
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%, standard errors in parentheses
Omitted years are 1995 and 2000.
Inc. Country
Effects
nc. Country and
Year Effects
Females Males
Simple
Regression
Inc. Country
Effects
Inc. Country and
Year Effects
Simple
Regression
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Table 2b: Secondary Level
Dependent variable: average years of secondary schooling in population aged 15 or above 
Constant 0.013 0.010 0.044 0.025 0.004 0.175 **
(0.010) (0.015) (0.041) (0.017) (0.028) (0.070)
Five-year lagged attainment 0.926 * 0.744 * 0.754 * 0.931 * 0.715 * 0.689 *
(0.023) (0.033) (0.035) (0.022) (0.036) (0.039)
Five-year lagged enrolment 0.466 * 0.872 * 0.759 * 0.425 * 1.001 * 0.726 *
(0.055) (0.080) (0.096) (0.058) (0.113) (0.137)
Difference between current and 0.505 * 0.510 * 0.436 * 0.537 * 0.666 * 0.537 *
five-year lagged enrolment (0.098) (0.103) (0.108) (0.108) (0.118) (0.124)
Year 1965 -0.049 -0.149 *
(0.035) (0.051)
Year 1970 -0.010 -0.082 ***
(0.033) (0.047)
Year 1975 -0.016 -0.090 **
(0.030) (0.043)
Year 1980 0.026 -0.020
(0.027) (0.039)
Year 1985 -0.030 -0.081 **
(0.026) (0.037)
Year 1990 0.026 0.022
(0.025) (0.036)
No. of observations 467 467 467 464 464 464
Adjusted R-squared 0.941 0.952 0.953 0.912 0.924 0.927
F test, country effects jointly zero 2.360 * 2.330 * 1.996 * 2.059 *
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%, standard errors in parentheses
Omitted years are 1995 and 2000.
Inc. Country
Effects
nc. Country and
Year Effects
Females Males
Simple
Regression
Inc. Country
Effects
Inc. Country and
Year Effects
Simple
Regression
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Table 3a: Total Primary and Secondary Years of Schooling for Off-Track Countries, Males
Revised 2000 2005 2015 2005 2015
Country Ranking Actual Projected Projected Projected Projected
Cameroon 2 4.03 3.81 3.38 3.97 3.78
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 4.08 3.35 2.17 3.63 3.13
Congo, Rep. 2 5.55 5.09 4.13 5.20 4.74
Gambia, The 2 2.98 3.13 3.43 2.94 3.06
Ghana 2 5.63 6.01 6.46 6.02 6.40
Guatemala 2 3.66 4.13 5.01 4.01 4.56
Nepal 2 3.26 3.66 4.49 3.43 3.90
Papua New Guinea 2 3.23 3.45 4.19 3.33 3.81
Sierra Leone 2 3.08 3.36 3.89 3.32 3.67
Turkey 2 5.90 6.01 6.36 5.92 6.17
Uganda 2 4.28 4.55 4.97 4.33 4.38
Zambia 2 5.91 5.61 5.04 5.77 5.55
Benin 3 3.25 3.66 4.68 3.41 3.96
Central African Republic 3 3.34 2.99 2.43 3.12 2.87
Guinea-Bissau 3 0.94 1.56 3.00 1.45 2.43
India 3 6.14 6.14 6.21 5.99 5.98
Liberia 3 3.23 3.44 4.13 3.50 3.96
Mali 3 1.17 1.90 3.60 1.79 2.85
Mozambique 3 1.37 1.72 2.49 1.79 2.36
Niger 3 1.36 1.41 1.49 1.52 1.65
Pakistan 3 5.02 5.58 6.80 5.33 6.01
Senegal 3 3.05 3.31 3.83 3.39 3.79
Togo 3 4.52 4.77 5.38 4.59 5.03
Afghanistan 4 2.49 3.76 5.76 3.48 4.68
Iraq 4 4.30 4.09 3.72 4.12 3.86
Source: Barro-Lee data (2000) and authors' calculations.
Country Effects Country and Year Effects
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Table 3b: Total Primary and Secondary Years of Schooling for Off-Track Countries, Females
Revised 2000
Country Ranking Actual Projected Target Projected Target Projected Target Projected Target
Cameroon 2 2.94 2.89 2.97 2.71 2.92 2.92 2.97 2.81 2.94
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 1.95 1.79 1.85 1.36 1.45 1.93 1.98 1.77 1.87
Congo, Rep. 2 4.54 4.41 4.58 3.83 4.19 4.48 4.62 4.15 4.44
Gambia, The 2 1.63 2.08 2.06 3.29 2.86 1.93 1.92 2.73 2.44
Ghana 2 2.14 2.67 2.69 3.53 3.49 2.70 2.71 3.48 3.45
Guatemala 2 3.03 3.50 3.55 4.50 4.64 3.41 3.44 4.14 4.26
Nepal 2 1.45 2.33 2.32 4.31 4.04 2.14 2.12 3.63 3.40
Papua New Guinea 2 2.42 2.70 2.72 3.66 3.65 2.58 2.60 3.24 3.24
Sierra Leone 2 1.70 2.13 2.07 3.37 2.90 2.08 2.04 3.00 2.69
Turkey 2 4.17 4.43 4.61 4.95 5.44 4.33 4.46 4.71 5.08
Uganda 2 2.72 3.12 3.15 3.96 3.97 2.93 2.96 3.35 3.38
Zambia 2 4.94 4.94 4.96 4.84 4.85 4.88 4.90 4.78 4.76
Benin 3 1.38 1.82 2.01 2.96 3.61 1.69 1.84 2.46 3.00
Central African Republic 3 1.70 1.66 1.77 1.53 1.85 1.70 1.78 1.66 1.87
Guinea-Bissau 3 0.74 1.13 1.31 2.45 2.97 1.04 1.17 1.99 2.41
India 3 3.66 3.99 4.13 4.66 4.97 3.83 3.94 4.22 4.48
Liberia 3 1.51 1.94 1.92 3.59 3.10 1.90 1.89 3.20 2.82
Mali 3 0.56 1.05 1.23 2.46 3.11 0.98 1.11 2.01 2.55
Mozambique 3 0.84 0.99 1.14 1.73 2.07 1.01 1.10 1.62 1.83
Niger 3 0.66 0.76 0.80 1.01 1.09 0.81 0.84 1.05 1.10
Pakistan 3 2.48 3.23 3.27 5.19 5.12 3.05 3.09 4.52 4.46
Senegal 3 1.93 2.28 2.33 3.16 3.18 2.26 2.29 2.89 2.92
Togo 3 2.08 2.58 2.76 3.69 4.22 2.45 2.61 3.26 3.72
Afghanistan 4 0.79 1.28 1.91 2.96 4.27 1.20 1.70 2.44 3.53
Iraq 4 3.18 3.23 3.43 3.22 3.81 3.16 3.31 3.09 3.51
Source: Barro-Lee data (2000) and authors' calculations.
Country Effects Country and Year Effects
20152005 2005 2015
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Table 4a: Effect on Economic Growth of Gender Parity in Education, Country Effects, Using Klasen (2002)
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon * 2 0.7 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.8 0.9 4.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. * 2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Congo, Rep. * 2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 na na na 0.1 0.0 0.2
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ghana ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guatemala 2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Uganda 2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zambia * 2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Benin 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Central African Republic * 3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.4 1.9
Guinea-Bissau 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 na na na 0.2 0.1 0.3
India *** 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
Mozambique 3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
Niger 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
Pakistan ** 3 0.1 0.0 0.1 .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Senegal 3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Togo 3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4
Afghanistan 4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4
Iraq *, *** 4 .. .. .. 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.9
"na" not available
* In these countries, male and female educational attainment are projected to fall.  If countries meet the target, the female fall would be smaller, but then the female-male ratio of the growth
in attainment would also (implausibly) be smaller (as a smaller negative number is divided by the same negative number yielding a smaller positive number).  To correct for this, 
the sign of the growth effect was reversed.
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
***In these countries, the growth effect of meeting the goal was estimated to be implausibly high due to the very small denominator of the male educational contraction and thus the huge
impact of changing the target expansion of female education.  Similarly, the effects for Turkey and Cameroon suffer from this problem to a lesser extent and the results should be treated with some
caution.  
30-Year Impact on Growth
1995-2005
95% Confidence Interval
10-Year Impact on Growth
2005-2015
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
1975-2005 1985-2015
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Table 4b: Effect on Economic Growth of Gender Parity in Education, 
Country Effects, Using Knowles et al. (2002)         
  Revised 1975-2005 1985-2015 
Country Ranking GDP Change (%) Growth Effect GDP Change (%) Growth Effect 
      95% Confidence Interval   95% Confidence Interval   95% Confidence Interval   95% Confidence Interval
Cameroon 2 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.7 0.8 2.6 1.0 0.6 1.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.5 1.9 0.7 0.4 1.0 
Congo, Rep. 2 na na na na na na 1.7 0.8 2.6 1.0 0.6 1.5 
Gambia, The ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Ghana ** 2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2.. .. .. .. .. .. 
Guatemala 2 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 
Nepal ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Papua New Guinea ** 2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2.. .. .. .. .. .. 
Sierra Leone ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey 2 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.6 0.3 0.9 2.4 1.1 3.8 1.4 0.8 2.1 
Uganda 2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Zambia 2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Benin 3 3.2 1.5 4.9 1.9 1.1 2.7 6.3 2.8 9.7 3.7 2.1 5.3 
Central African Republic 3 2.0 0.9 3.0 1.2 0.7 1.7 4.9 2.2 7.5 2.9 1.6 4.1 
Guinea-Bissau 3 na na na na na na 6.9 3.1 10.6 4.1 2.3 5.8 
India 3 1.0 0.4 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 1.6 0.7 2.5 1.0 0.5 1.4 
Liberia ** 3.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Mali 3 5.4 2.4 8.3 3.2 1.8 4.6 8.5 3.9 13.2 5.0 2.8 7.3 
Mozambique 3 4.6 2.1 7.2 2.7 1.5 4.0 5.6 2.5 8.6 3.3 1.9 4.7 
Niger 3 1.9 0.8 2.9 1.1 0.6 1.6 2.4 1.1 3.7 1.4 0.8 2.0 
Pakistan ** 3 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4.. .. .. .. .. .. 
Senegal 3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Togo 3 2.1 0.9 3.2 1.2 0.7 1.8 3.7 1.7 5.7 2.2 1.2 3.1 
Afghanistan 4 14.8 6.7 22.9 8.8 4.9 12.6 14.4 6.5 22.2 8.5 4.8 12.2 
Iraq 4 1.7 0.8 2.7 1.0 0.6 1.5 4.2 1.9 6.5 2.5 1.4 3.6 
"na" not available                           
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s 
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.    
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe 
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.          
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Table 4c: Effect on Economic Growth of Gender Parity in Education, Country and Year Effects, Using Klasen (2002)
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon * 2 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. * 2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
Congo, Rep. * 2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 na na na 0.2 0.1 0.3
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ghana ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 1.1 0.4 1.8 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Uganda 2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zambia *** 2 .. .. .. 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Benin 3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
Central African Republic * 3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
Guinea-Bissau 3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.6 na na na 0.2 0.1 0.3
India *** 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Mozambique 3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
Niger 3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Pakistan ** 3 0.1 0.0 0.1 .. .. .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Senegal 3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Togo 3 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5
Afghanistan 4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.1 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.5
Iraq *, *** 4 .. .. .. 0.8 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5
"na" not available
* In these countries, male and female educational attainment are projected to fall.  If countries meet the target, the female fall would be smaller, but then the female-male ratio of the growth
in attainment would also (implausibly) be smaller (as a smaller negative number is divided by the same negative number yielding a smaller positive number).  To correct for this, 
the sign of the growth effect was reversed.
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
***In these countries, the growth effect of meeting the goal was estimated to be implausibly high due to the very small denominator of the male educational contraction and thus the huge
impact of changing the target expansion of female education.  Similarly, the effects for Turkey and Cameroon suffer from this problem to a lesser extent and the results should be treated with some
caution.  
1995-2005
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
30-Year Impact on Growth
1975-2005 1985-2015
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
2005-2015
10-Year Impact on Growth
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Table 4d: Effect on Economic Growth of Gender Parity in Education, Country and Year Effects, Using Knowles et al. (2002)     
  Revised 1975-2005 1985-2015 
Country Ranking GDP Change (%) Growth Effect GDP Change (%) Growth Effect 
      
95% Confidence 
Interval   
95% Confidence 
Interval   
95% Confidence 
Interval   
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Cameroon 2 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.6 0.3 0.9
Congo, Rep. 2 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.6 1.9 0.7 0.4 1.0
Gambia, The ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Ghana ** 2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1.. .. .. .. .. .. 
Guatemala 2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.5
Nepal ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Papua New Guinea ** 2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sierra Leone ** 2.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey 2 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.7 2.5 0.9 0.5 1.4
Uganda 2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Zambia 2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Benin 3 2.2 1.0 3.4 1.3 0.7 1.8 5.5 2.5 8.5 3.2 1.8 4.7
Central African Republic 3 1.1 0.5 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 2.4 1.1 3.7 1.4 0.8 2.0
Guinea-Bissau 3 3.4 1.5 5.2 2.0 1.1 2.9 5.9 2.7 9.1 3.5 2.0 5.0
India 3 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.3 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.4 1.1
Liberia ** 3.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Mali 3 3.8 1.7 5.8 2.2 1.3 3.2 7.9 3.6 12.3 4.7 2.6 6.8
Mozambique 3 2.3 1.0 3.5 1.3 0.8 1.9 3.4 1.5 5.2 2.0 1.1 2.9
Niger 3 0.9 0.4 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.5 1.6 0.6 0.3 0.9
Pakistan ** 3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3.. .. .. .. .. .. 
Senegal 3 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2
Togo 3 1.4 0.6 2.1 0.8 0.5 1.2 3.3 1.5 5.1 2.0 1.1 2.8
Afghanistan 4 11.7 5.3 18.1 6.9 3.9 9.9 13.3 6.0 20.5 7.9 4.4 11.3
Iraq 4 1.1 0.5 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.9 2.6 1.2 4.0 1.5 0.9 2.2
                            
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s 
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.     
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe 
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.          
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Fertility and Child Mortality Regressions
Dependent variables: total fertility rate and under-5 child mortality rate in 1990
Constant 4.444 * 6.316 * 145.116 * 244.727 *
(0.558) (0.592) (24.682) (28.754)
Per capita GDP (1990) 0.000 ** 0.000 ** -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Male total years of schooling (1990) 0.136 -0.118 ** 2.131 -10.388 *
(0.136) (0.059) (6.455) (2.653)
Female total years of schooling (1990) -0.358 * -18.102 *
(0.130) (6.259)
Female/male ratio of total years of schooling (1990) -2.619 * -142.377 *
(0.496) (29.264)
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.240 * 2.051 * 57.951 * 49.771 *
(0.497) (0.480) (20.266) (18.785)
Latin America & Caribbean 0.512 0.650 *** -4.874 4.360
(0.355) (0.332) (14.095) (13.087)
South Asia 0.672 0.461 7.287 -4.088
(0.572) (0.535) (19.124) (18.548)
OECD 0.301 0.219 10.927 6.137
(0.385) (0.345) (15.189) (12.595)
Middle East & North Africa 1.581 * 1.406 * -8.985 -18.826
(0.472) (0.466) (16.724) (16.499)
Europe & Central Asia -0.337 -0.496 22.963 14.316
(0.405) (0.380) (14.576) (12.700)
No. of observations 105 105 109 109
Adjusted R-squared 0.810 0.834 0.707 0.762
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%, standard errors in parentheses
Omitted region is East Asia and the Pacific.
Fertility Child Mortality
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
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Table 6a: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country Effects,
Using Female/Male Ratio of Total Years of Schooling
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -2.9 -4.0 -1.7 -9.1 -12.7 -5.4
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -2.6 -3.6 -1.5 -6.1 -8.5 -3.6
Congo, Rep. 2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -4.7 -6.7 -2.8 -12.3 -17.2 -7.3
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 0.7 1.0 0.4
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.6 -2.3 -1.0 -4.0 -5.6 -2.4
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 -0.6 0.2 0.3 0.1
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -4.1 -5.8 -2.5 -11.1 -15.6 -6.6
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.5 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -7.5 -10.5 -4.5 -19.6 -27.5 -11.7
Central African Republic 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -5.4 -7.6 -3.2 -18.9 -26.5 -11.3
Guinea-Bissau 3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -16.5 -23.1 -9.8 -24.8 -34.8 -14.8
India 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -3.4 -4.7 -2.0 -7.1 -9.9 -4.2
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -13.9 -19.5 -8.3 -25.7 -36.1 -15.4
Mozambique 3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -12.3 -17.2 -7.3 -19.0 -26.6 -11.3
Niger 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -4.6 -6.5 -2.8 -8.4 -11.7 -5.0
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.6 -0.7 1.6 2.2 1.0
Senegal 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -2.9 -1.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -5.2 -7.3 -3.1 -13.8 -19.4 -8.3
Afghanistan 4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -23.9 -33.5 -14.3 -32.3 -45.2 -19.3
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -7.0 -9.8 -4.2 -22.6 -31.7 -13.5
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval95% Confidence Interval
2005 2015
95% Confidence Interval
Fertility Impact Child Mortality Impact
2005 2015
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Table 6b: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country Effects,
Using Female Total Years of Schooling
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.4 -2.3 -0.4 -3.9 -6.5 -1.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.1 -1.8 -0.4 -1.7 -2.8 -0.5
Congo, Rep. 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -3.1 -5.1 -1.0 -6.4 -10.8 -2.1
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 0.6 1.0 0.2
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -1.4 -0.3 -2.5 -4.2 -0.8
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3.1 -5.3 -1.0 -9.0 -15.1 -2.9
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -3.5 -5.8 -1.1 -11.7 -19.6 -3.8
Central African Republic 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.0 -3.4 -0.7 -5.8 -9.8 -1.9
Guinea-Bissau 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3.3 -5.5 -1.1 -9.5 -15.9 -3.1
India 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.6 -4.4 -0.9 -5.6 -9.4 -1.8
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -3.4 -5.7 -1.1 -11.8 -19.7 -3.8
Mozambique 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.7 -4.5 -0.9 -6.0 -10.1 -1.9
Niger 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -1.4 -0.3 -1.6 -2.6 -0.5
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.3 -0.3 1.4 2.3 0.4
Senegal 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -1.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3.2 -5.3 -1.0 -9.5 -15.9 -3.0
Afghanistan 4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -11.4 -19.2 -3.7 -23.6 -39.6 -7.6
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -3.6 -6.1 -1.2 -10.7 -17.9 -3.4
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
Fertility Impact Child Mortality Impact
2005 2015 2005 2015
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Table 6c: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country and Year Effects
Using Female/Male Ratio of Total Years of Schooling
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -1.8 -2.5 -1.1 -4.9 -6.9 -2.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -2.2 -3.1 -1.3 -4.6 -6.4 -2.7
Congo, Rep. 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia, The ** 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3 13.6 19.1 8.1
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 0.7 1.0 0.4
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 -1.8 -0.8 -3.7 -5.1 -2.2
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -3.3 -4.6 -1.9 -8.6 -12.1 -5.1
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -1.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -0.6
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -6.2 -8.7 -3.7 -19.4 -27.2 -11.6
Central African Republic 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3.4 -4.8 -2.0 -10.4 -14.6 -6.2
Guinea-Bissau 3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -12.7 -17.8 -7.6 -24.7 -34.6 -14.7
India 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -2.7 -3.8 -1.6 -6.0 -8.4 -3.6
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -10.8 -15.1 -6.4 -26.5 -37.2 -15.8
Mozambique 3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -7.2 -10.1 -4.3 -13.0 -18.2 -7.8
Niger 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -2.6 -3.6 -1.5 -3.9 -5.5 -2.3
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -1.3 -0.6 1.5 2.1 0.9
Senegal 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -2.3 -1.0 -1.2 -1.7 -0.7
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -4.7 -6.5 -2.8 -13.1 -18.4 -7.8
Afghanistan 4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -20.5 -28.8 -12.3 -33.1 -46.5 -19.8
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -5.1 -7.2 -3.0 -15.6 -21.8 -9.3
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
2015
Fertility Impact Child Mortality Impact
2005 2015 2005
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
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Table 6d: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country and Year Effects,
Using Female Total Years of Schooling
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.9 -1.5 -0.3 -2.4 -3.9 -0.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.0 -1.7 -0.3 -1.8 -3.0 -0.6
Congo, Rep. 2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.5 -4.2 -0.8 -5.2 -8.8 -1.7
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 1.0 0.2
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 -1.1 -0.2 -2.1 -3.6 -0.7
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.4 -4.1 -0.8 -6.8 -11.3 -2.2
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.2
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -2.7 -4.5 -0.9 -9.8 -16.4 -3.1
Central African Republic 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.4 -2.3 -0.4 -3.8 -6.4 -1.2
Guinea-Bissau 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -2.3 -3.9 -0.7 -7.6 -12.8 -2.5
India 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -2.1 -3.5 -0.7 -4.6 -7.7 -1.5
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -2.5 -4.1 -0.8 -9.6 -16.2 -3.1
Mozambique 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -1.6 -2.8 -0.5 -3.9 -6.5 -1.3
Niger 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 -0.3
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 1.2 1.9 0.4
Senegal 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.2 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -2.7 -4.6 -0.9 -8.4 -14.0 -2.7
Afghanistan 4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -9.1 -15.3 -2.9 -19.7 -33.1 -6.4
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 -2.7 -4.5 -0.9 -7.7 -12.8 -2.5
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
Fertility Impact Child Mortality Impact
2005 2015 2005 2015
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
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Table 7a: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country Effects, Sensitivity Analysis (Schultz, 1994)
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.4 -2.6 -1.5 -3.8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 -1.6
Congo, Rep. 2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 na na na na na na
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. na na na na na na
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.4 0.2 0.6
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.9 -1.9 -1.1 -2.8
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -2.4 -1.3 -3.5 -6.9 -3.8 -9.9
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.3 -2.4 -1.3 -3.4 -8.0 -4.4 -11.5
Central African Republic 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -1.4 -0.8 -2.0 -4.0 -2.2 -5.7
Guinea-Bissau 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -2.0 -1.1 -2.9 -5.9 -3.3 -8.6
India 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.9 -1.1 -2.8 -4.0 -2.2 -5.8
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -2.1 -1.1 -3.0 -7.2 -4.0 -10.4
Mozambique 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.7 -1.0 -2.5 -3.9 -2.1 -5.6
Niger 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 -1.4
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.8 1.0 0.5 1.4
Senegal 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -2.2 -1.2 -3.1 -6.5 -3.6 -9.4
Afghanistan 4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -1.2 -1.6 -0.7 -6.6 -3.7 -9.5 -13.6 -7.5 -19.7
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 -2.6 -1.4 -3.7 -7.5 -4.2 -10.9
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
95% Confidence 95% Confidence95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence
Fertility Impact Child Mortality Impact
2005 2015
Pooled Regression
2005 2015
Fixed Effects Regression
2005 2015
Interval IntervalInterval Interval Interval Interval
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Table 7b: Impact on Fertility and Child Mortality Rates of Gender Parity in Education, Country and Year Effects, Sensitivity Analysis (Schultz, 1994)
Revised
Country Ranking
Cameroon 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -1.6 -0.9 -2.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.8
Congo, Rep. 2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 na na na na na na
Gambia, The ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. na na na na na na
Ghana 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6
Guatemala 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -1.6 -0.9 -2.3
Nepal ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1
Sierra Leone ** 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Turkey 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.1 -2.9 -7.4
Uganda 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5
Zambia 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2
Benin 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.3 -1.8 -1.0 -2.7 -6.7 -3.7 -9.6
Central African Republic 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.3 -2.6 -1.4 -3.7
Guinea-Bissau 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -1.5 -0.8 -2.1 -4.8 -2.6 -6.9
India 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.5 -0.8 -2.2 -3.3 -1.8 -4.8
Liberia ** 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -0.8 -2.2 -5.9 -3.3 -8.5
Mozambique 3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.1 -0.6 -1.5 -2.5 -1.4 -3.6
Niger 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7
Pakistan 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 0.8 0.5 1.2
Senegal 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6
Togo 3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.7 -3.2 -8.3
Afghanistan 4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -1.0 -1.3 -0.6 -5.2 -2.9 -7.6 -11.4 -6.3 -16.4
Iraq 4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -1.9 -1.0 -2.7 -5.4 -3.0 -7.8
** In these countries, the target attainment for females is indistinguishable or even smaller than the projected attainment.  This is due to huge jumps in enrolments in the late 1990s
and consequent high imputed growth rates in enrolments.  Once these are extrapolated to 2005 (or 2015), they suggest no gender gaps and associated costs.  
Thus, we do not estimate costs for these countries.  But since we question the accuracy of the latest enrolment figures as well as the extrapolation of high enrolment growth, we believe
that the costs will be similar to other countries' in the same rank.
95% Confidence 95% Confidence95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence 95% Confidence
Child Mortality Impact
2005 20152005 2015
Fertility Impact
2005 2015
Pooled Regression Fixed Effects Regression
Interval IntervalInterval Interval Interval Interval
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Table 8: Impact of Gender Parity in Education on Child Malnutrition (Smith and Haddad, 1999)
Revised
Country Ranking
Angola * 2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 .. .. ..
Burundi * 2 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 .. .. ..
Cambodia 2 -0.8 -1.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
Cameroon 2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Comoros * 2 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 .. .. ..
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 -1.5 -2.6 -0.4 -1.0 -1.7 -0.3
Congo, Rep. 2 -2.4 -4.2 -0.6 -2.0 -3.4 -0.5
Djibouti * 2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Gambia, The * 2 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 .. .. ..
Ghana * 2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 .. .. ..
Guatemala 2 -0.9 -1.6 -0.2 -1.3 -2.2 -0.3
Lao PDR 2 -2.0 -3.5 -0.5 -1.4 -2.4 -0.3
Mauritania * 2 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 .. .. ..
Morocco 2 -1.1 -1.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.1
Nepal * 2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Nigeria * 2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1 .. .. ..
Papua New Guinea * 2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2 .. .. ..
Sierra Leone * 2 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Solomon Islands 2 -1.6 -2.7 -0.4 -1.9 -3.4 -0.5
Turkey 2 -3.0 -5.1 -0.8 -2.1 -3.6 -0.5
Uganda 2 -0.9 -1.5 -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.2
Zambia * 2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 1.3 2.2 0.3
Benin 3 -3.8 -6.7 -1.0 -6.4 -11.2 -1.6
Burkina Faso 3 -0.7 -1.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1
Central African Republic 3 -0.9 -1.6 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2
Cote d'Ivoire 3 -1.9 -3.3 -0.5 -1.4 -2.5 -0.4
Guinea-Bissau 3 -2.8 -4.9 -0.7 -4.3 -7.5 -1.1
India 3 -2.6 -4.6 -0.7 -1.5 -2.6 -0.4
Liberia * 3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mali 3 -2.9 -5.1 -0.8 -7.0 -12.2 -1.8
Mozambique 3 -0.9 -1.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -0.1
Niger * 3 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 .. .. ..
Pakistan * 3 -1.3 -2.3 -0.3 .. .. ..
Senegal 3 -1.0 -1.8 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
Togo 3 -5.0 -8.7 -1.3 -4.5 -7.9 -1.2
Yemen, Rep. * 3 -3.3 -5.7 -0.8 .. .. ..
Afghanistan 4 -14.1 -24.5 -3.6 -3.9 -6.9 -1.0
Chad 4 -2.4 -4.1 -0.6 -2.5 -4.3 -0.6
Eritrea 4 -4.0 -7.0 -1.0 -7.3 -12.7 -1.9
Ethiopia 4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
Guinea 4 -2.6 -4.6 -0.7 -3.5 -6.2 -0.9
Iraq 4 -2.7 -4.8 -0.7 -2.3 -4.1 -0.6
Lithuania 4 -9.3 -16.2 -2.4 -11.8 -20.6 -3.0
Somalia 4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.1
Tajikistan 4 -2.7 -4.7 -0.7 -3.2 -5.7 -0.8
* These countries are projected to have higher female than male secondary enrolments either already by 2005 or by 2015,
so it is not appropriate to report the costs of failing to achieve the gender equity goal.
Percentage Point Change in Prevalence of Underweight
95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval
2005 2015
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